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AN INQUIRY INTO THE PERCEPTION OF MATERIALITY AS AN ELEMENT OF 
SCIENTER UNDER SEC RULE 10b-5 
 
by Allan Horwich* 
 
An essential element of a claim under Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC” or 
“Commission”) Rule 10b-51 is that the defendant acted with scienter.2  A much-litigated issue in 
private suits for damages based on a violation of Rule 10b-5 is whether the plaintiff has 
adequately pleaded the defendant’s scienter.  Scienter is also at the core of actions by the SEC to 
seek a remedy for violations of that rule and by the Department of Justice to prosecute 
violations.3  One often overlooked issue is the relationship of scienter to the materiality of the 
deception that lies at the heart of the claim.4  Recent developments in the law of scienter under 
                                                 
* Senior Lecturer, Northwestern University School of Law; partner, Schiff Hardin LLP. 
ahorwich@schiffhardin.com; a-horwich@law.northwestern.edu.   This Article speaks as of April 
1, 2011, unless otherwise noted. The views expressed are solely those of the author and should 
not be attributed to any client of Schiff Hardin LLP. 
1 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011), adopted by the SEC pursuant to Section 10(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”), 15 U.S.C § 78j(b) (2006). 
2 “In a typical § 10(b) private action a plaintiff must prove (1) a material 
misrepresentation or omission by the defendant; (2) scienter; (3) a connection between the 
misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance upon the 
misrepresentation or omission; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss causation.” Stoneridge Inv. 
Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 157 (2008).  Where applicable (see infra note 
3) these elements must also be pleaded . See Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 
1309, 1318 (2011) (referring to need to plead material misrepresentation or omission and 
scienter); Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 346 (2005) (referring to need to 
plead loss causation and economic loss). 
3 Reliance and loss causation need not be established in an SEC enforcement proceeding 
or criminal prosecution for a violation of Rule 10b-5; the materiality of the deception and 
defendant’s scienter remain elements of a civil or criminal enforcement claim. DONNA M. NAGY 
RICHARD W. PAINTER & MARGARET V. SACHS, SECURITIES LITIGATION AND ENFORCEMENT 
CASES AND MATERIALS 147 (2d. ed. 2008). 
4 More than a decade ago, this author published an analysis of the relevance in a Rule 
10b-5 private damage or government enforcement action of the defendant’s consciousness of the 
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Rule 10b-5, including the Supreme Court’s decision in Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano and 
other cases that address the intersection of scienter and materiality, prompt a comprehensive 
assessment of this relationship. 
I. THE LAW OF SCIENTER UNDER RULE 10b-5 
In order to state a cause of action under Rule 10b-5, whether a private suit for damages or 
a civil or criminal enforcement action, the plaintiff must established that the defendant acted with 
scienter, which is “mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.”5  A specific 
intent to violate Rule 10b-5 is not an essential element of scienter.6  To establish a criminal 
violation of Rule 10b-5, the prosecution must prove that the defendant “willfully” violated the 
                                                                                                                                                             
materiality of his alleged non-disclosure or misrepresentation. Allan Horwich, The Neglected 
Relationship of Materiality and Recklessness in Actions under Rule 10b-5, 55 BUS. LAW. 1023 
(2000).  The thesis of that article was: 
 
[W]here a defendant is charged with recklessly misrepresenting or failing to 
disclose a material fact, the assessment of recklessness necessarily entails an 
evaluation of whether the defendant appreciated, or was reckless in not 
appreciating, the materiality of the fact.  To put the issue in the form of a 
question: is a speaker reckless when he fails to disclose a fact that he knows if he 
does not recognize it to be material, or negligently concludes that it is not 
material? 
Id. at 1023.  While others have since addressed the relationship of scienter and materiality (see 
infra text accompanying notes 18-21 and note 74), they have not done so from the perspective of 
the defendant’s actual assessment of materiality at the time of the event giving rise to the claim.  
See also Clarissa S. Hodges, The Qualitative Considerations of Materiality: The Emerging 
Relationship between Materiality and Scienter, 30 SEC. REG. L. J. 4, 20 (2002) (discussing the 
extent to which scienter is to be taken into account in determining the materiality of a 
quantitatively small misstatement). 
 
5 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193, 194 n.12 (1976) (private action for 
damages); Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 691 (1980) (SEC enforcement action). 
6 Pittsburgh Terminal Corp. v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 680 F.2d 933, 943 (3d Cir. 
1982) (holding that violation of Rule 10b-5 can be established without a showing of a specific 
intent to violate the law); SEC v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 629 F.2d 62, 77 (D.C. Cir. 1980) 
(“Except in very rare instances, no area of the law – not even the criminal law – demands that a 
defendant have thought his actions were illegal.”). 
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provision.7  Here, too, there is no requirement to prove that the defendant had a specific intent to 
violate the law.8 
The Supreme Court has never decided whether scienter encompasses reckless conduct; it 
has repeatedly expressly reserved the question for thirty five years.9  After Hochfelder, however, 
the courts of appeal uniformly have held that scienter encompasses reckless conduct.10   
                                                                                                                                                             
 
7 See, e.g., United States v. Tarallo, 380 F.3d 1174, 1188 (9th Cir. 2004) (“‘willfully’ as it 
is used in [15 U.S.C.] § 78ff(a) [the criminal sanction provision of the Exchange Act] means 
intentionally undertaking an act that one knows to be wrongful; ‘willfully’ in this context does 
not require that the actor know specifically that the conduct was unlawful”). 
8 See United States v. Dixon, 536 F.2d 1388, 1397 (2d Cir. 1976). 
9 See, e.g., Matrixx, 131 S. Ct. at 1323-24 (“we assume, without deciding, that the 
[recklessness] standard applied by the Court of Appeals is sufficient to establish scienter”) 
(footnote omitted);  Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 319 n.3 (2007) 
(reserving question);  Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 378 n. 4 (1983) (same); 
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 194 n.12 (same).   
Tellabs addressed the heightened standard for pleading scienter in a private cause of 
action for damages added to the Exchange Act by Section 101 of the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737, 747 (1995).  That provision 
became Section 21D(b)(2) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2006).  It was 
renumbered Section 21D(b)(2)(A) by Section 933(b) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1883 (2010).  The heightened 
standard requires that in a private action under the Exchange Act for money damages that may be 
maintained “only on proof that the defendant acted with a particular state of mind, the complaint 
shall, with respect to each act or omission alleged to violate [the Exchange Act], state with 
particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state 
of mind.”  By its express terms (“[i]n any private action”), this heightened pleading standard 
does not apply in an SEC enforcement action under Rule 10b-5. SEC v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 363 
F. Supp. 2d 708, 717 (D.N.J.  2005); SEC v. ICN Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 
1099 (C.D. Cal. 2000).   
It is generally agreed that the imposition of the heightened pleading requirement when 
alleging “a particular state of mind” in a private cause of action under Rule 10b-5 did not change 
the “required state of mind,” viz., scienter. MICHAEL A. PERINO, SECURITIES LITIGATION UNDER 
THE PSLRA § 3.02, at 3-150 to -151 (2011) (“The PSLRA clearly does not purport to alter the 
general state of mind requirements of a Rule 10b-5 action. . . .  The ‘strong inference’ [pleading] 
standard does not alter Rule 10b-5’s substantive scienter requirement.”).  See also infra notes 10-
11 and accompanying text.   
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A long-accepted definition of reckless conduct in this context is 
a highly unreasonable omission, involving not merely simple, or even inexcusable 
negligence, but an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care, and 
which presents a danger of misleading buyers or sellers that is either known to the 
defendant or is so obvious that the actor must have been aware of it.11  
                                                                                                                                                             
The heightened pleading standard for scienter also does not change the burden of proof 
on the merits in a private action for damages, which is a preponderance of the evidence. Tellabs, 
551 U.S. at 328-29. See also In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., No. 02 Civ. 
05571(RJH)(HBP), 2011 WL 590915, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2011) (applying standard of 
preponderance of the evidence in ruling on defendant’s motions for judgment as a matter of law 
or for new trial in action under Rule 10b-5).  In deciding a motion for summary judgment some 
courts have applied the Tellabs interpretation of the “strong inference” requirement. See, e.g., 
Nolfi v. Ohio Kentucky Oil Corp., 562 F. Supp. 2d 904, 910 (N.D. Ohio 2008) (“[Tellabs and 
other cited cases] deal with the pleading standard required for these claims, but [the court] finds 
that the underlying rationale is applicable to the summary judgment setting as well”). It is 
unclear what effect this approach would have on the traditional preponderance burden of proof at 
trial. 
10 See Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 319 n.3 (“Every Court of Appeals that has considered the issue 
has held that a plaintiff may meet the scienter requirement by showing that the defendant acted 
intentionally or recklessly, though the Circuits differ on the degree of recklessness required.”). 
11 Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1045 (7th Cir. 1977) (quoting 
Franke v. Midwestern Okla. Dev. Auth., 428 F. Supp. 719, 725 (W.D. Okla. 1976), vacated on 
other grounds, 619 F.2d 856 (10th Cir. 1980)). This is the “most widely followed approach” to 
defining recklessness for these purposes.” 8 LOUIS LOSS, JOEL SELIGMAN & TROY PARADES, 
SECURITIES REGULATION 3688 (3d ed. 2004).   
Many courts currently apply this standard of recklessness. See, e.g., City of Dearborn 
Heights 345 Police & Fire Retirement System v. Waters Corp., 632 F.3d 751, 757 (1st Cir. 2011) 
(quoting Sundstrand definition of recklessness); Gebhart v. SEC, 595 F.3d 1034, 1041-42 (9th 
Cir. 2010) (holding that reckless conduct that constitutes scienter is an extreme departure from 
the standards of ordinary care which presents a danger of misleading buyers or sellers that is 
either known to the defendant or is so obvious that the actor must have been aware of it); South 
Cherry Street, LLC v. Hennessee Group LLC, 573 F.3d 98, 109 (2d Cir. 2009) (same); Flaherty 
& Crumrine Preferred Income Fund, Inc. v. TXU Corp., 565 F.3d 200, 207 (5th Cir. 2009) 
(same); Institutional Investors Group v. Avaya, Inc., 564 F.2d 242, 267 n.42 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(same).  A recent survey of the different expressions of reckless conduct that is sufficient to 
satisfy Rule 10b-5 concluded that in the end they essentially state what Sundstrand held. Ann 
Morales Olazábal, Defining Recklessness: A Doctrinal Approach to Deterrence of Secondary 
Market Securities Fraud, 2010 WISC. L. REV.  1415, 1424, 1442. 
Some courts apply a higher standard of recklessness as a threshold of liability where the 
defendant is an outside auditor.  
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In this seminal decision, the court elaborated that to be reckless a failure of disclosure “must 
derive from something more egregious than even ‘white heart/empty head’ good faith.”12  The 
court explained that “if a trial judge found, for example, that a defendant genuinely forgot to 
disclose information or that it never came to his mind, etc., this prong of the [recklessness test] 
would defeat a finding of recklessness even though the proverbial ‘reasonable man’ would never 
have forgotten.”13  This interpretation of the test is still applied, at least in the Seventh and Ninth 
Circuits.14 
The reference to a risk that is known or obvious presents alternative formulations – what 
is actually known or what is obvious.  Sundstrand stated that the test for recklessness was an 
“objective” one,15 but in fact application of the test sometimes entails an inquiry into the actual 
conduct of the defendant and in particular what the defendant actually knew.16  This is especially 
                                                                                                                                                             
[T]he meaning of recklessness in securities fraud cases is especially stringent 
when the claim is brought against an outside auditor. . . .  Recklessness on the part 
of an independent auditor entails a mental state so culpable that it approximate[s] 
an actual intent to aid in the fraud being perpetrated by the audited company.  . . .  
Scienter requires more than a misapplication of accounting principles. The 
[plaintiff] must prove that the accounting practices were so deficient that the audit 
amounted to no audit at all, or an egregious refusal to see the obvious, or to 
investigate the doubtful, or that the accounting judgments which were made were 
such that no reasonable accountant would have made the same decisions if 
confronted with the same facts. 
PR Diamonds, Inc. v. Chandler, 364 F.3d 671, 693-94 (6th Cir. 2004) (internal quotations and 
citations omitted).  
 
12 Sundstrand, 553 F.2d at 1045 (footnote omitted). 
13 Id. at 1045 n.20. 
14 SEC v. Platforms Wireless Intern. Corp., 617 F.3d 1072, 1093 (9th Cir. 2010); ABN 
AMRO, Inc. v. Capital Intern. Ltd., 595 F. Supp. 2d 805, 842 (N.D. Ill. 2008). 
15 Sundstrand, 553 F.2d at 1045. 
16 See infra text accompanying notes 106-111. 
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so because the test depends not only on knowledge of the facts that create the risk, but, crucially, 
actual or imputed appreciation of the risk itself – it is only where the “danger of misleading” is 
known or sufficiently “obvious” that the defendant acted recklessly.  This depends upon the 
potential impact (“misleading”) of the faulty disclosure on investors, which in turn depends on 
the materiality of the information.17 
One recent commentator found the jurisprudence of recklessness under Rule 10b-5 to be 
“rudderless.”18  She proposed an approach that would infer recklessness at the pleading stage in 
order to determine whether a private complaint for damages “state[s] with particularity facts 
giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant” acted with scienter.19  The proposal is that 
in suits involving putative false statements by officers, upon a motion to dismiss 
three contextual factors can establish and limit inferences of an officer’s 
recklessness available. These factors are the magnitude, atypicality, and timing of 
the misinformation or its disclosure. Put otherwise, my thesis is that while no 
officer is expected to, nor can she, know every detail about a large publicly traded 
corporation, it is the epitome of recklessness for a highly paid corporate head to 
speak to the market about important corporate matters without knowing the truth. 
Hence, when pleading a circumstantial case of recklessness against a high-ranking 
corporate executive, a complaint that identifies the truth – placing it in the 
relevant corporate context – can establish a cogent and compelling inference that 
the true fact misrepresented was so important that the officer was either reckless 
in failing to know it or reckless in speaking about it without knowing.20 
                                                 
17 See infra text accompanying notes 32-38. 
18 Olazábal, supra note 11, 2010 WISC. L. REV.  at 1421.  See id. 1421-29 and 1442-45 
for a discussion of the law of recklessness under Rule 10b-5.  Professor Olazábal makes clear 
that her proposal applies only to the pleading stage in a private action for damages. Id. at 1455 
(“the analysis I promote here applies at the pleading stage. It provides a more principled 
definition of recklessness for purposes of determining whether a ‘strong inference’ of scienter 
can be drawn from the facts set forth in a class action fraud-on-the-market complaint.”).  
19 See supra note 9 (describing the heightened standard for pleading scienter in private 
actions for damages).   
20 Olazábal, supra note 11, at 1420-21 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). 
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Under this proposal the inference of scienter may not be appropriate where the materiality of the 
information was uncertain or borderline.21  Thus, whether to infer scienter, at least at the 
pleading stage, would be driven in part by the significance of the information. The present author 
parts company with Professor Olazábal principally in concluding that the defendant’s own 
conception of the materiality of omitted facts that are material is a factor to be weighed in the 
recklessness analysis,22 both at the pleading stage and, more likely, on the merits.23 
There is a line of cases, sometimes referring to a company’s “core operations,” where 
there is attribution to senior management of knowledge of omitted or misrepresented information 
because the facts are “so important to the company” that the defendants must have been aware of 
them.24  This applies, however, only where the facts are “so important,” not where the materiality 
is less clear.25   
                                                 
21 The author stated, “On the other side of that coin, misrepresented numbers or facts that 
are trivial in proportion to the company’s overall revenues, illegal practices that are small in 
scope, or matters that would otherwise be deemed immaterial, are probably not within the realm 
of what we can or should expect a CEO or CFO to know with any certainty.” Id. at 1432 
(footnote omitted).   
 
22 The relevance of the defendant’s assessment of materiality is most likely to arise where 
a material fact has been omitted, rather than where it has been misrepresented, albeit the 
omission may be in the context of a half truth, the “omi[ssion] to state a material fact necessary 
in order to make the statements made . . . not misleading.” Rule 10b-5(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-
5(b) (2011). See infra text accompany note 123.  When the failure to disclose violates Rule 10b-5 
was analyzed in Todd R. Davis & Lisa A. Begni, When is Silence Fraudulent?, LAW360 (Feb. 8, 
2011), 
http://www.law360.com/securities/articles/223288?utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email
&utm_campaign=securities (copy on file with author), in which some of the cases discussed later 
were discussed. 
23 It would be an unusual case where the plaintiff would have facts regarding the 
defendant’s actual consideration of the materiality of undisclosed facts and would choose to 
plead them.  Thus, the defendant’s actual consideration of the materiality of an omitted fact is far 
more likely to be addressed on the merits.   
24 Berson v. Applied Signal Technology, Inc., 527 F.3d 982, 987-889 (9th Cir. 2008). See 
also Institutional Investors Group v. Avaya, 564 F.3d 242, 270 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding that chief 
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The decision of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals on the Supreme Court’s remand in 
Tellabs applied a variation of this approach.  In first reversing the district court’s grant of the 
motion to dismiss the corporate defendant, the court held: 
[I]t is possible to draw a strong inference of corporate scienter without being able 
to name the individuals who concocted and disseminated the fraud. Suppose 
General Motors announced that it had sold one million SUVs in 2006, and the 
actual number was zero. There would be a strong inference of corporate scienter, 
since so dramatic an announcement would have been approved by corporate 
officials sufficiently knowledgeable about the company to know that the 
announcement was false.26 
                                                                                                                                                             
financial officer’s denials of widespread discounting involving many different product lines and 
accounts, including some of the company’s largest clients, was of such a “a substantial 
magnitude” that the alleged misrepresentations supported an inference of recklessness, whereas 
“[i]f the alleged discounting were minor or restricted to only a few products or customers, we 
would be reluctant to infer that [his] denials were culpable”); Desai v. General Growth 
Properties, Inc., 654 F. Supp. 2d. 836, 860 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (finding that scienter was adequately 
pleaded insofar as the claim related to the allegations that “the company’s very survival was at 
stake, and so . . . the insider Defendants either had to know about General Growth’s ability or 
inability to refinance its looming debt or, if they did not, such lack of knowledge would amount 
to reckless disregard.”).  In one case applying this concept, the court upheld a complaint in part, 
concluding that “[t]he individual defendants were not entitled to make statements concerning the 
company’s financial statements and ignore reasonably available data that would have indicated 
that those statements were materially false or misleading.” In re Atlas Air Worldwide Holdings, 
Inc. Sec. Litig., 324 F. Supp. 2d. 474, 491 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (emphasis added).   
Professor Olazábal maintains that her approach differs from the core operations doctrine. 
Olazábal, supra note 11, at 1431 n.75.   It is beyond the scope of this article to evaluate the 
differences between the core operations doctrine and Professor Olazábal’s thesis. 
25 See, e.g., Plumbers and Pipefitters Local Union No. 630 Pension-Annuity Trust Fund 
v. Arbitron Inc., 741 F. Supp. 2d 474, 490 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (dismissing complaint in part, 
declining to apply “core operations” doctrine where the complaint rested on “more nuanced, 
small-bore details”).   
26 Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs Inc., 513 F.3d 702, 710 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 
 -9-  
Applying a similar analysis to the claim against the company’s chief executive officer,27 the 
court observed that the Sundstrand recklessness test that “the danger was either known to the 
defendant or so obvious that the defendant must have been aware of it” 
looks like two criteria - knowledge of the risk and how big the risk is - but as a 
practical matter it is only one because knowledge is inferable from gravity (“the 
danger was either known to the defendant or so obvious that the defendant must 
have been aware of it”). When the facts known to a person place him on notice of 
a risk, he cannot ignore the facts and plead ignorance of the risk.28  
This explanation begs the question of the relevance of the defendant’s awareness or appreciation 
of the “gravity” of the facts, presumably meaning facts that are especially material. 
Especially after the Tellabs direction to consider the totality of the complaint in assessing 
whether scienter has been plead,29 the application of the core operations doctrine is very case-
specific.30  Accordingly, when looking at the entirety of a complaint courts may hold that sheer 
magnitude of the alleged deception alone is not sufficient to allege scienter.31  As assessment of 
                                                 
27 Id. at 711 (“Is it conceivable that he was unaware of the problems of his company’s 
two major products and merely repeating lies fed to him by other executives of the company? It 
is conceivable, yes, but it is exceedingly unlikely.”) 
 
28 Id. at 704. 
 
29 Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 322, 325. 
30 The core operations doctrine has not proven to be a cure-all for plaintiffs, as it often 
fails to provide the basis for satisfying the heightened scienter pleading standard. See, e.g., Zucco 
Partners, LLC v. Digimarc Corp., 552 F.3d 981, 1000-1002 (9th Cir. 2009) (upholding dismissal 
of complaint and summarizing the narrow scope of the core operations inference). 
31 See, e.g., In re Spear & Jackson Sec. Litig., 399 F. Supp. 2d 1350, 1359, 1362-63 (S.D. 
Fla. 2005) (dismissing complaint against accountant where magnitude of the deception was only 
one factor, among others, in determining whether scienter has been pleaded and upholding 
complaint against chief executive officer where his “inaction in the face of such suspicious 
accounting problems alone may not rise to ‘severe’ recklessness, [but] factoring in [his] clear 
motive and opportunity to mislead investors creates sufficient severity”).  This is consistent with 
the approach advocated by Professor Olazábal, who would base the inference of scienter on three 
factors, not only the magnitude of the misrepresentation or omission, in light of the defendant’s 
position within the corporation. See supra text accompanying note 20. 
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how these tests for scienter apply requires an understanding of the concept of materiality under 
Rule 10b-5. 
II. THE LAW OF MATERIALITY UNDER RULE 10b-5 
In an action under Rule 10b-5, a fact is material if “there is a substantial likelihood that a 
reasonable shareholder would consider it important” in making his investment decision.32  An 
omitted fact is material if there is “a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact 
would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ 
of information made available.”33   
“The question of materiality, it is universally agreed, is an objective one, involving the 
significance of an omitted or misrepresented fact to a reasonable investor.”34 Materiality is a 
mixed question of fact and law.35  Whether a fact is immaterial, however, can be decided by a 
                                                 
32 Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231 (1988) (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v. 
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (action under SEC Rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 
(2011))).   For discussions of the concept of materiality, see Richard C. Sauer, The Erosion of the 
Materiality Standard in the Enforcement of the Federal Securities Laws, 62 BUS. LAW. 317, 323 
(2007) (footnotes omitted), and Horwich, supra note 4, 55 BUS. LAW. at 1026-32 (both 
addressing, among other sources, SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99 – Materiality, 64 Fed. 
Reg. 45,150 (Aug. 19, 1999), http://www.sec.gov/interps/account/sab99.htm).  
33 Basic, 485 U.S. at 231-32 (quoting TSC, 426 U.S. at 449). 
34 TSC, 426 U.S. at 445. But see Steven M. Davidoff, In Corporate Disclosure, a Murky 
Definition of Material, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2011, at B6 (stating, after quoting the “total mix” 
definition of materiality, that it “is a subjective legal standard”). 
35 See TSC, 426 U.S. at 450 (“The issue of materiality may be characterized as a mixed 
question of law and fact, involving as it does the application of a legal standard to a particular set 
of facts. . . . Only if the established omissions are ‘so obviously important to an investor, that 
reasonable minds cannot differ on the question of materiality’ is the ultimate issue of materiality 
appropriately resolved ‘as a matter of law’ by summary judgment.”).   
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court on a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment.36  Courts rarely find materiality as a 
matter of law where the issue is contested.37 
Where the allegedly deceptive statement is about something that has not yet occurred, 
“materiality ‘will depend at any given time upon a balancing of both the indicated probability 
that the event will occur and the anticipated magnitude of the event in light of the totality of the 
company activity.”’38  In Basic, the Court held only that the probability/magnitude test applies to 
merger negotiations.39 The test is now routinely applied to a wide array of disclosures that have a 
forward-looking element to them.  The case from which Basic drew the probability/magnitude 
test involved an evolving situation regarding the discovery of minerals.40  The test has since been 
                                                 
36 See, e.g., In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1425-27 (3d Cir. 
1997) (finding certain alleged omissions immaterial as a matter of law in affirming, in part, grant 
of motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim) (Alito, J.); SEC v. Siebel Systems, Inc., 384 F. 
Supp. 2d 694, 704 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (“where the subject statements are so blatantly unimportant, 
it is appropriate for the Court to rule, as a matter of law [on a motion to dismiss], that the 
statements do not meet the materiality threshold, and to dismiss the complaint”).  This is in 
addition to statements that are immaterial because they are covered by the statutory safe harbor 
for forward-looking statements or the comparable bespeaks caution doctrine, or are mere puffery. 
See Allan Horwich, Cleaning the Murky Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking Statements: An 
Inquiry into Whether Actual Knowledge of Falsity Precludes the Meaningful Cautionary 
Statement Defense, 35  J. CORP. L. 519, 526-27 & n.38, 556-59  (2010). 
37 Cf. Wilson v. Great American Indus., Inc., 855 F.2d 987, 989, 991-95 (2d Cir. 1988) 
(reversing bench trial judgment for defendant, remanding for determination of damages and 
ordering entry of judgment for plaintiff, finding that certain facts were material, stating “The 
facts are not in dispute. In such a case, we are in as good a position as the district court to draw 
inferences and conclusions from the facts.”). 
38 Basic, 485 U.S. at 238 (quoting SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d 
Cir. 1968) (en banc)).   
39 Basic, 485 U.S. at 232 n.9 (“We do not address here any other kinds of contingent or 
speculative information, such as earnings forecasts or projections.”).   
40 Basic, 485 U.S. at 238, citing Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 849. 
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applied in cases involving the riskiness of assets owned by a financial firm,41 a potential 
corporate restructuring,42 contingent financing,43 plans to oust a member of the board of 
directors,44 plans to construct a new manufacturing facility,45 and entry into a new sales 
contract,46 among many contexts.47   
As the Supreme Court held in its first definitive opinion on materiality under the 
securities laws, “The determination [of materiality] requires delicate assessments of the 
inferences a ‘reasonable shareholder’ would draw from a given set of facts and the significance 
of those inferences to him . . . .”48  In addressing the complexity of the determination of 
materiality, one commentator stated: 
The first tremors of a problem that eventually bankrupt a business, particularly if 
confined to a segment or subdivision of the company, might go unrecognized by 
the most astute observer, yet become a clear harbinger of disaster when 
considered in light of later developments.  Similarly, it may be difficult to assess 
the materiality of information that was incomplete at the relevant date. In insider 
                                                 
41 In re Bear Stearns Companies, Inc. Sec., Deriv., and ERISA Litig., No. 08 MDL 1963, 
2011 WL 223540, at *82 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2011) (holding that materiality adequately pleaded). 
42 SEC v. Rorech, 720 F. Supp. 2d 367, 411 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (holding on the merits 
information was not material). 
43 Great American Indus., 855 F.2d at 993 (reversing bench trial judgment in favor of 
defendants and ordering entry of judgment for plaintiff, holding that information was material). 
44 In re General Motors Class E Stock Buyout Sec. Litig., 694 F. Supp. 1119, 1128 (D. 
Del. 1988) (holding on motion to dismiss that certain information was not material). 
45 Milton v. Van Dorn Company, 961 F.2d 965, 969-71 (1st Cir. 1992) (Breyer, J.) 
(affirming summary judgment for defendants, holding that information was not material). 
46 Gay v. Axline, 23 F.3d 394 (Table), 1994 WL 159426, at *6-8 (1st Cir. 1994) 
(affirming bench trial judgment in favor of defendants that information was not material, albeit 
on different analysis than applied by the district court). 
47 For other examples, see  J. ROBERT BROWN, JR., THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE 
DISCLOSURE § 505.[3][c], at 5-77 (3d ed. 2011). 
48 TSC, 426 U.S. at 450. 
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trading cases, for example, a company insider may argue that the non-public 
information to which the insider was privy at the time of the trading was too 
vague, partial, or preliminary to have driven his or her investment decisions.  In 
such situations, hindsight may prove a particularly unreliable guide.49 
Another commentator has observed, “Figuring out what exactly constitutes material information 
is largely an exercise in futility because the Supreme Court has adopted a definition so vague that 
almost any tidbit about a company could fall within it.”50   As a result, jury determinations of 
materiality “seem to boil down largely to Justice Potter Stewart’s oft-cited shibboleth about 
pornography, ‘I know it when I see it.’”51 
The probability/magnitude test52 is particularly knotty.  This is a “highly fact-dependent” 
test,53 laden with uncertainty.  For example, focusing on applying the test in the context of 
insider trading, one leading commentator has observed: 
Although the probability/magnitude language sounds technically 
sophisticated and precise, in fact it is inherently subjective and indeterminate. . . . 
[T]here is no magic product to serve as a threshold above which information 
becomes material.  The court never tells us how high a probability nor how large a 
magnitude is necessary for information to be deemed material.  One thus inside 
                                                 
49 Sauer, supra note 32, 62 BUS. LAW. at 323 (footnotes omitted). See also Hodges, supra 
note 4, 30 SEC. REG. L. REV. at  36-37 (advocating a broad interpretation of materiality while 
also discussing how implementation of Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99 - Materiality, supra 
note 32, “is undeniably fraught with ambiguity, uncertainty, and unpredictability”). 
50  Peter J. Henning, A Standard that Raises More Questions than it Answers, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 7, 2011, at F6.  
51 Id. The author further observed, “The S.E.C. relies on the vague materiality standard 
apparently because it provides greater flexibility in deciding whether to pursue an enforcement 
action for a failure to disclose. Absent a clearer definition, companies are kept guessing about 
what comprises material information, perhaps so they will disclose more information to be safe.” 
Id.  This outcome would be contrary to the expressed reasoning in TSC, where the Court stated 
that if there were too low a threshold for materiality, management would “bury the shareholders 
in an avalanche of trivial information.” TSC, 426 U.S. at 448-49. 
 
52 See supra text accompanying note 38. 
53 Basic, 485 U.S. at 239 n.16. 
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trades on the basis of speculative information knowing that a jury, acting with the 
benefit of hindsight, may reach a different conclusion about how probability and 
magnitude should be balanced than you did.54 
In practice this test is very difficult to apply before the fact,55 with a significant risk of hindsight 
bias when a case is litigated.56 
                                                 
54 STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, SECURITIES LAW: INSIDER TRADING 35-36 (2d ed. 2007). See 
also LARRY D. SODERQUIST & THERESA A. GABALDON, SECURITIES LAW 136 (4th ed. 2011) 
(“Understanding the substantial-likelihood standard itself is relatively easy.  It is sometimes 
difficult, however, to predict what misstatement or omission a court will determine fits under the 
standard.”). 
55 See, e.g., BROWN, supra note 47, at § 5.05[3][a], at 5-71 to -72 (describing 
“magnitude” and “probability” as “elusive terms,” noting that magnitude “may depend in part 
upon one’s vantage point” and stating that “[p]robability essentially requires a look into a crystal 
ball”); Donald Langevoort, Rereading Cady, Roberts: The Ideology and Practice of Insider 
Trading Regulation, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1319, 1337 (1999) (“in my experience, the largest 
portion of the frustration that insiders have in deciding whether they can trade in a particular 
situation comes in trying to characterize the significance of the information that they know under 
the so-called ‘probability/magnitude’ test.”) (footnote omitted). 
56 Hindsight bias in securities litigation was summarized in one leading article: 
  Hindsight blurs the distinction between fraud and mistake. People 
consistently overstate what could have been predicted after events have unfolded 
– a phenomenon psychologists call the hindsight bias. People believe they could 
have predicted events better than was actually the case and believe that others 
should have been able to predict them. Consequently, they blame others for 
failing to have foreseen events that reasonable people in foresight could not have 
foreseen. In the context of securities regulation, hindsight can mistakenly lead 
people to conclude that a bad outcome was not only predictable, but was actually 
predicted by managers. Even in the absence of any misconduct, a bad outcome 
alone might lead people to believe that corporate managers committed securities 
fraud. The hindsight bias thus creates a consider-able obstacle to the fundamental 
task in securities regulation of sorting fraud from mistake. 
Mitu Gulati, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Donald C. Langevoort, Fraud by Hindsight, 98 NW. U. L. 
REV. 773, 774 (2004) (footnotes omitted).  This bias particularly affects materiality 
determinations in securities litigation. Id. at 790 (“After the material event occurs, the warning 
sign will come to seem like a clear harbinger of the adversity that followed. Numerous studies of 
the hindsight bias reveal that knowing the outcome makes the antecedents seem more significant 
than was actually the case.”) (footnote omitted). 
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Newly minted lawyers are sent into the professional world with fair warning of the 
difficulty of assisting their clients in making judgments about materiality.  One leading casebook 
states, “Outside of litigation, considering whether an item is material and thus must be disclosed 
is frequently an ulcerating experience.”57  Two other casebook authors state, “Unfortunately, 
determining whether a particular morsel of information is material is often an uncertain 
process.”58  Authors of a leading student securities law text caution, “For the securities lawyer 
worrying about disclosure, digging to find nonspecified information and then determining 
whether it is material takes the most skill and judgment.”59 
The recent Supreme Court decision in Matrixx suggests just how fact- (and judgment-) 
intensive materiality determinations can be.  The Rule 10b-5 claim at issue there was brought by 
investors in a pharmaceutical company that had failed to disclose adverse event reports regarding 
a product whose sales were a significant component of the company’s revenues.60  As it had in 
Basic, where the issue was the materiality of merger negotiations, the Court rejected a bright line 
test of materiality proposed by the defendants, that the event reports were material under the 
securities laws only if they were “statistically significant.”61  Following the Basic “total mix” 
                                                 
57 JAMES D. COX, ROBERT W. HILLMAN & DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SECURITIES 
REGULATION CASES AND MATERIALS 586 (6th ed. 2009). 
58 STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND ANALYSIS 
46 (2d ed. 2008).   
59 SODERQUIST & GABALDON, supra note 54, at 72.   
Some may seek to escape this conundrum by applying the conservative watchword 
“when in doubt, disclose.” This seems simple, but it is hardly practical, much less the foundation 
for liability when not followed. 
60 Matrixx, 131 S.Ct. at 1313, 1323. 
61 Id. at 1318-19. 
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test,62 the Court held that determining whether adverse event reports were material to investors 
“requires consideration of the source, content, and context of the reports. This is not to say that 
statistical significance (or the lack thereof) is irrelevant - only that it is not dispositive of every 
case.”63  The Court then held that the allegations of the complaint “‘raise a reasonable 
expectation that discovery will reveal evidence’ satisfying the materiality requirement.”64  The 
analysis leading to this conclusion required a review of all of the information alleged to have 
been available to the defendants, all as matched against the (allegedly misleading) statements 
made by Matrixx.65 
It is often said that materiality can be inferred from the defendant’s own actions.66  This 
approach, however, is not dispositive of the question of materiality.67  One commentator has 
criticized this approach to determining materiality. 
                                                 
62 See supra  text accompanying note 33. 
63 Matrixx, 131 S. Ct. at 1321.  The Court elaborated that  
the mere existence of reports of adverse events - which says nothing in and of 
itself about whether the drug is causing the adverse events - will not satisfy this 
standard. Something more is needed, but that something more is not limited to 
statistical significance and can come from “the source, content, and context of the 
reports,” supra at 1321. This contextual inquiry may reveal in some cases that 
reasonable investors would have viewed reports of adverse events as material 
even though the reports did not provide statistically significant evidence of a 
causal link. 
131 S. Ct. at 1321 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). 
 
64 Matrixx, 131 S. Ct. at 1323 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 
556 (2007)). 
65 131 S. Ct. at 1322-23. 
66 See, e.g., SEC v. Maio, 51 F.3d 623, 637 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that trading while 
aware of information “tends to show” that the information was material); Rubinstein v. Collins, 
20 F.3d 160, 170 n.39 (5th Cir. 1994) (observing that trading prior to disclosure is “indicative” of 
materiality); Rorech, 720 F. Supp. 2d at 412  (“courts often look to the actions of those who were 
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A major issue in insider trading cases is whether the allegedly insider 
trading behavior can serve as proof that the facts on which the insider traded were 
material.  The problem, of course, is the potential for bootstrapping: if the 
allegedly illegal trade proves that the information is material, the materiality 
requirement becomes meaningless – all information in the defendant’s possession 
when he or she traded would be material.68 
For this and other reasons, an irrebuttable presumption would improperly beg the question of 
cause and effect.  Apart from whether the investor in question is the “reasonable investor” whose 
perspective is the measure of the materiality of information,69 it avoids the fundamental factual 
issue of whether learning the information resulted in the trade or was just one of many factors – 
or no factor at all – resulting in a trade at that time.70  (This of course applies only where the 
person actually knew the information, which may be contested.)  That is, a person could trade for 
                                                                                                                                                             
privy to the information in determining materiality”). See WILLIAM K. S. WANG & MARC I. 
STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING § 4.2.2, at 112 n. 54 (3d ed. 2010) (collecting cases). 
67 See, e.g., Abromson v. American Pacific Corp., 114 F.3d 898, 903 n.3 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(“the presence of insider sales is at most probative of materiality”); Chelsea Associates v. 
Rapanos, 527 F.2d 1266, 1270 (6th Cir. 1975) (affirming ruling in favor of defendant that 
undisclosed fact was not material although defendant had sold stock knowing this information, 
stating, “[T]he importance a defendant insider attaches to information in deciding whether to 
purchase or sell stock is highly persuasive evidence of materiality. . . . However, we do not 
understand such evidence to be conclusive.”). 
68 BAINBRIDGE, supra note 54, at 36. 
69 See supra text accompanying notes 32-38. 
70 The SEC’s position is that an insider who trades in his company’s stock while “aware” 
of material nonpublic information violates Rule 10b-5 in the absence of a defense, such as that 
the trade was prearranged in compliance with Rule 10b5-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (2011). See 
Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Release No. 33-7881, 65 F.R. 51716, 51727 (Aug. 24, 
2000).  For a comprehensive discussion of that rule, and the SEC’s position that Rule 10b5-1 
affords the only affirmative defenses to a claim of insider trading, see Allan Horwich, The 
Origin, Application, Validity and Potential Misuse of Rule 10b5-1, 62 BUS. LAW. 913 (2007).  
The issue addressed in the present Article, however, is not the availability of affirmative defenses 
but whether the defendant’s own trading establishes the materiality of everything nonpublic of 
which he is, or might be, aware. 
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any number of reasons unrelated to the material investment merits of the particular security.71 
Moreover, this post hoc ergo propter hoc approach may fail to take simple elements of timing 
into account.  Suppose fact X emerges on Day 1, and the insider becomes aware of it at that time.  
The fact remains undisclosed to the public, and on Day 40 the insider trades.  It is tenuous to 
infer that, because X traded on Day 40, X was a material fact.  The inference would be much 
stronger had the trade occurred on Day 1 or even Day 10. 
The need for caution in inferring materiality from the fact of trading has a parallel with 
the inferring scienter from the act of trading.  Although trading by insiders at a time when they 
are alleged to have known material nonpublic material information may support an inference of 
scienter, the act of trading does not inevitably lead to that inference, that there was an intent to 
deceive.  Whether trading by insiders is indicative of scienter, a motive deliberately to withhold 
the (material) truth from the public, depends on the character of the trading, such as the amount 
                                                 
71 See, e.g., 18 DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING: REGULATION, 
ENFORCEMENT & PREVENTION § 5:2, at 5-12 (2011) (“A professional analyst, for example, is 
constantly evaluating the companies for which he is responsible, using a wide variety of 
information sources.  The mere fact that he causes his clients to buy or sell after receiving some 
nonpublic information does not prove conclusively that his recommendation was based on that 
information.”).  The author then notes, however, that “in many cases, the fact of trading is 
largely inexplicable except by saying that the insider or tippee felt that the information in 
question was indeed significant.” Id.  See also Declaration of Marc I. Steinberg in United States 
v. Martha Stewart, at ¶ 3 (Feb. 19, 2004), reprinted in MARC I. STEINBERG, SECURITIES 
REGULATION 657-59 (Rev. 5th ed. 2009): 
 Corporate executive officers and directors, including CEOs, sell shares of 
a subject company’s stock for a variety of reasons, many of which have nothing to 
do with the subject company.  It is well known that a CEO of a U.S. publicly-held 
company may sell stock: because he/she needs money to use for personal or 
business purpose(s); to ameliorate margin dilemmas in his/her securities 
account(s); to diversify the CEO’s portfolio to include a broader number and type 
of investments; to convey a gift; to generate cash to repay a loan or for some other 
obligation; or for tax planning purposes (especially at the end of the year).  
Normally, these reasons are irrelevant to the subject company and communicate 
no useful information to investors about the subject company. 
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of shares or dollars involved in comparison to the defendant’s holdings and whether the trading 
departed from prior patterns of the defendant’s trading in the company’s stock.72   
As explained earlier, a defendant acts recklessly in violation of Rule 10b-5 if he knows of 
a danger of misleading investors or the risk of misleading investors is so obvious he must have 
been aware of that risk.73  This actual or inferred awareness of a risk seems to be dependent upon 
the extent to which the information he knows is material, so that he does, or should reasonably, 
understand that non-disclosure may adversely influence investors.74  Stated another way, what 
                                                 
72 Mississippi Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Boston Scientific Corp., 523 F.3d 75, 92-93 (1st 
Cir. 2008) (holding that allegations of insider trading by the defendants supported the element of 
scienter, recognizing that “[i]nsider trading in suspicious amounts or at suspicious times may be 
probative of scienter.”).  On remand, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the 
defendants.  On the element of scienter, the lower court ruled that the plaintiff’s claims of 
defendants’ insider trading did not support proof of scienter where, among other factors, some 
defendants increased their holdings and many of the defendant sellers did not make sales “well 
beyond normal sales patterns.” In re Boston Scientific Corp. Sec. Litig., 708 F. Supp. 2d 110, 
127 (D. Mass. 2010), appeal docketed, No. 10-1663 (1st Cir. June 11, 2010).  See also Metzler 
Inv. GMBH v. Corinthian Colleges, Inc., 540 F.3d 1049, 1067 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding 
allegations of stock trading by defendants did not support conclusion of scienter, where, among 
other factors, only one defendant made large sales, many of which were before the occurrence of 
a government agency investigation that allegedly was not disclosed on a timely basis, another 
defendant sold “only” 37% of his holdings during the class period, and many sales were in a 
manner consistent with pre-class period sales). On pleading scienter by alleging the defendant’s 
insider trading, see PERINO, supra note 9, § 3.01 D.5.b, at 3-124 to -134. 
 
73 See supra text accompanying notes 11-16. 
74 The interdependence of scienter and materiality at the pleading stage is not a new 
insight.  A number of years before Professor Olazábal’s analysis (supra text accompanying notes 
18-21), several commentators observed: 
As a practical matter, the objective/subjective distinction between 
materiality and scienter is artificial.  Plaintiffs generally do not have direct 
evidence going to the defendant’s subjective state of mind at the motion to 
dismiss stage.  The question on scienter thus becomes whether the information in 
question was so obviously important to investors that the failure to disclose it 
constituted severe recklessness.  That articulation of scienter is merely a 
heightened level of materiality: the information was so obviously important, 
which is scienter, as opposed to important, which is materiality.  
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matters is the potential impact (“misleading”) of the faulty disclosure on investors, which in turn 
depends on the materiality of the information, because it is only information that it is 
“substantial[ly] like[ly]” that an investor “would consider important” that is of concern under 
Rule 10b-5.75  The test is not just more probable than not that the investor would consider  the 
fact important, nor even substantially likely that the investor might consider it important.76 
  The next section of this article discusses cases where the defendant’s awareness vel non 
of the materiality of the undisclosed information did in fact bear on whether he acted with 
scienter in not disclosing those facts. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Gulati, Rachlinski & Langevoort, supra note 56, 98 NW. U. L. REV. at 791.  The thesis of this 
Article is that a defendant’s actual assessment of materiality at the time the wrong was alleged to 
have occurred is in fact sometimes an important element of the scienter analysis, not that 
materiality is a proxy for, or ground to infer, intent, though that may sometimes be the case 
where materiality is indisputable ex ante. 
 
75 See supra text accompanying note 32. 
76 These may be fine distinctions, but one very important aspect of TSC, 426 U.S. at 446-
47 (1976), was its correction of a “misplaced” reliance on statements in two earlier decisions of 
the Court that were interpreted by some to establish the test for materiality to be those facts that 
“might” rather than “would” influence an investor.  In Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 
375, 384 (1970), the Court had stated that a determination of materiality “indubitably embodies a 
conclusion that the defect was of such a character that it might have been considered important 
by a reasonable shareholder,” and in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-
54 (1972), the Court had stated, “All that is necessary is that the facts withheld be material in the 
sense that a reasonable investor might have considered them important in the making of this 
decision.” See The Supreme Court, 1975 Term – Narrowing Liability under the 1934 Act, 90 
HARV. L. REV. 255, 261 (1976) (“Justice Marshall [in TSC] dismissed as dicta statements in 
previous cases indicating that the Court had adopted the ‘might’ standard.”) (footnote omitted). 
Compare Marx v. Computer Sciences Corp., 507 F.2d 485, 489 (9th Cir. 1974) (applying test of 
whether a reasonable man would attach importance to the fact misrepresented in determining his 
choice of action in the transaction in question, noting the language in both Affiliated Ute  and 
Mills but “adher[ing] to the traditional and less speculative common law language of the 
objective test”) (quotation marks and citations omitted), with SEC v. First American Bank and 
Trust Company, 481 F.2d 673, 681 (8th Cir. 1973) (“The standard [of materiality] in omission or 
non-disclosure cases should be whether a reasonable man in the position of an investor might 
well decide not to purchase the security if the fact or facts were disclosed,” citing Affiliated Ute  
and Mills).  
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III. RECENT CASES THAT ADDRESS THE INTERSECTION OF SCIENTER 
(RECKLESSNESS) AND MATERIALITY 
The law of Rule 10b-5 thus provides, in both the private liability and enforcement 
contexts, that the defendant violates the rule only if he acted with an intent to deceive – including 
acting recklessly – in making a material misrepresentation or making a statement that omits 
material facts necessary in order to make the statements made not misleading.77  In many cases, 
the materiality of the information that was misrepresented, or that was not disclosed, is clear.78  
In other situations, however, the defendant may have thought about what he was about to say 
(such as utter a statement about a public company of which he is a senior executive) or do (such 
as trade in stock of that company) and reached a good faith conclusion that nonpublic 
information of which he is aware is not material – or he was not reckless in failing to appreciate 
the materiality of the substantive deficiency of his statement.  The remainder of this article 
focuses on those situations.  
 A. The Background for an Analysis of Scienter under Rule 10b-5 – A Digression 
  into the Common Law 
If the facts are not material their omission would not be expected to influence the 
behavior of the (reasonable) investor.  It would indeed be an odd use of language to say that 
someone intended to deceive another – to influence her action – by failing, even intentionally, to 
disclose to her facts that the reasonable investor would not consider important. In ordinary 
                                                 
77 This Article focuses on material deception through false statements or through silence 
when there is a duty to speak and, most especially, alleged trading while aware of material 
nonpublic information.  Rule 10b-5 is broader than that.  In addition to deceptive statements and 
manipulation (with “manipulation” narrowly construed, see Santa Fe Ind. v. Green, 430 U.S. 
462, 476-77 (1977)), Rule 10b-5 also reaches deceptive non-verbal conduct. See Stoneridge, 552 
U.S. at 158; and 7 LOSS, SELIGMAN & PARADES, supra note 11, at 3536-41 (3d ed. rev. 2003) 
(discussing non-verbal acts, such as a broker’s unauthorized trading in a customer account). 
78 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 24-31 (discussing the core operations 
doctrine).   
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discourse one would not say, “I intended to deceive her by failing to disclose something I did not 
expect would influence her decision.”  In that situation there is no intent to deceive.79 
This is in accord with many common law precedents.  The common law of deceit is an 
appropriate starting point to analyze the meaning of “intent to deceive” because that was the 
source of the ruling in Hochfelder interpreting the operative words of Section 10(b) of the 
Exchange Act.80  One widely-accepted interpretation of the common law of fraud and deceit is 
that 
                                                 
79 Consider the following: 
For a large class of cases – though not for all – in which we employ the 
word “meaning” it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the 
language. 
. . . .  
 One cannot guess how a word functions.  One has to look at its use and 
learn from that. 
 
 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 43, at 20, and § 340, at 109 (G.E.M. 
Anscombe trans., 3d ed. 1958).  If a term has an established meaning in the legal context, of 
course that should be used.  The “ordinary” meaning and the “legal” meaning may be close, if 
not identical, as they are in the case of “intend.” 
 
Intend = (1) in ordinary language, to desire that a consequence will follow from 
one’s conduct; or (2) in legal language, to contemplate that consequences of one’s 
act will necessarily or probably follow from the act, whether or not those 
consequences are desired for their own sake. 
BRYAN A. GARNER, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE 457 (2d ed. 1995). 
 
 The myriad cases that apply the concept of “intent to deceive” as an element of common 
law deceit are not consistent, however.  For a survey of the law of scienter at common law, see 
FOWLER V. HARPER, FLEMING JAMES, JR. & OSCAR S. GRAY, HARPER, JAMES AND GRAY ON 
TORTS §§ 7.1-7.3 (3d ed. 2006). 
 
80 In Hochfelder the Court looked to the commonly understood meaning of the words in 
the statute (“manipulative,” “deceptive” and “contrivance”) at the time the Exchange Act was 
adopted. 425 U.S. at 203-204.  It is likewise appropriate to consider what was meant by “intent 
to deceive” at that time.  It is useful to recall the holding of Hochfelder – an action under Rule 
10b-5 requires proof of scienter and “the term ‘scienter’ refers to a mental state embracing intent 
to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.” 425 U.S. at 193 & n.12. 
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 One who fraudulently makes a misrepresentation of fact, opinion, 
intention or law for the purpose of inducing another to act or to refrain from 
acting in reliance upon it, is subject to liability to the other in deceit for pecuniary 
loss caused to him by his justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation.81 
The Restatement was relied upon in the following judicial summary of the common law of intent 
to deceive: 
The intent element of common-law civil fraud is well established. According to 
the Restatement . . . , “One who fraudulently makes a misrepresentation . . . for 
the purpose of inducing another to act or to refrain from action in reliance upon it, 
is subject to liability to the other in deceit . . . .” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 525 (1976); see also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON 
THE LAW OF TORTS, § 105, at 728 (5th ed.1984) (“[a]n intention to induce the 
plaintiff to act or refrain from action in reliance upon the misrepresentation” is an 
element of tort of deceit). Commentary roughly contemporary with the Congress 
that enacted the mail fraud statute in 1872 gives a similar definition of the intent 
element. “It is said that a man is liable to an action for deceit if he makes a false 
representation to another, knowing it to be false, but intending that the other 
should believe and act upon it . . . .” OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE 
COMMON LAW 132 (1881); see also 2 CHARLES G. ADDISON, A TREATISE ON THE 
LAW OF TORTS § 1174, at 398 (H.G. Wood ed., 1881) (“[I]f a falsehood be 
knowingly told, with an intention that another person should believe it to be true, 
                                                 
81 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1977).  This is substantially the same as the 
original version of the Restatement, with the changes coming in the final words, which had read 
“in reliance thereon in a business transaction is liable to the other for the harm caused to him by 
his justifiable reliance upon the representation.” RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 525 (1938). See also 
id. Scope Note (“This Title [‘Fraudulent Misrepresentations’] deals only with the rules which 
determine the liability for pecuniary harm caused by fraudulent misrepresentations made for the 
purpose of influencing another’s conduct in a business transaction.”) (emphasis added). 
Subsequent provisions in the RESTATEMENT define the “Conditions under which 
Misrepresentation is Fraudulent (Scienter)” and state the “General Rule” specifying the persons 
to whom the misrepresenter is liable for his misrepresentation, but they do not alter the basic 
“purpose” concept expressed in Section 525.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 526, 531.  
Although Section 531 extends liability to persons the misrepresenter “intends or has reason to 
expect to act or to refrain from action in reliance upon the misrepresentation,” nothing in that 
section suggests that the underlying wrong set forth in Section 525 does not in all cases require a 
“purpose of inducing.”  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 531, cmt. a (“This Section 
deals with the persons to whom the maker of a fraudulent representation may be liable.  The 
general rule of liability for fraudulent misrepresentation is stated in § 525.”) 
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and act upon it, . . . the party telling the falsehood is responsible in damages in an 
action for deceit . . . .”).82 
These common law antecedents strongly suggest that there was an intent to deceive only 
when one acted for the “purpose” of inducing another to (reasonably) rely.  There should be no 
expectation, and thus purpose, that another would rely unless the information conveyed, or 
omitted, was of a sort that would influence the other, which is to say that the information was 
material.83 
                                                 
82 United States v. Kenrick, 221 F.3d 19, 29 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding that intent to 
deceive, but not intent to harm, is element of crime of federal bank fraud).  Kenrick drew on the 
common law precedents in order to discern the meaning of the federal mail fraud statute, 18 
U.S.C. 1344, when it was enacted.  While not all courts have followed Kenrick’s interpretation of 
the mail fraud statute (see, e.g., United States v. Everett, 270 F.2d 986, 990 (6th Cir. 2001)), 
Kenrick’s summary of the common law is sound. 
Language similar to that quoted from Kenrick appears in an earlier Supreme Court case 
under the federal securities laws: 
 Even in a damage suit between parties to an arm’s-length transaction, the 
intent which must be established need not be an intent to cause injury to the client, 
as the courts below seem to have assumed. “It is to be noted that it is not 
necessary that the person making the misrepresentations intend to cause loss to 
the other or gain a profit for himself; it is only necessary that he intend action in 
reliance on the truth of his misrepresentations.” 1 HARPER AND JAMES, THE LAW 
OF TORTS (1956), 531.   “[T]he fact that the defendant was disinterested, that he 
had the best of motives, and that he thought he was doing the plaintiff a kindness, 
will not absolve him from liability, so long as he did in fact intend to mislead.” 
PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS (1955), 538. See 3 RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1938), s 531, 
Comment b, illustration 3. It is clear that respondents’ failure to disclose the 
practice here in issue was purposeful, and that they intended that action be taken 
in reliance on the claimed disinterestedness of the service and its exclusive 
concern for the clients’ interests. 
SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 193 n.39 (1963) (involving claim 
under the Investment Advisers Act) (dictum) (emphasis added). 
 
83 In the context of bank fraud “material” has a broader meaning than the “reasonable 
person” test under the securities laws. See supra text accompanying notes 32-34. Bank fraud 
encompasses the situation where “the maker of the representation knows or has reason to know 
that its recipient regards or is likely to regard the matter as important in determining his choice of 
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 B. Rule 10b-5 Cases Recognizing the Relevance of Materiality to Scienter 
If, as discussed above,84 the magnitude of the allegedly undisclosed problems may 
support an inference of scienter in a claim against senior management, then the converse applies.  
Thus, where income had been overstated by less than 1% for the period in question, “any weight 
given to an inference of scienter because of the duration of the accounting irregularities must be 
tempered by their relatively small magnitude.”85  To put the issue in the typical terminology of 
recklessness, the “danger of misleading” was not “obvious.”86  A claim was held not to allege 
scienter where “the accounting irregularities Plaintiffs allege in this case are significantly less 
egregious in nature and magnitude [that those in a case cited by plaintiffs] and thus do not 
support a strong inference that nondisclosure of the correct numbers was the product of a 
deliberate or reckless effort by the Individual Defendants to defraud investors.”87 
This author’s earlier article on this topic cited cases that had suggested that, wholly apart 
from the objective test of what was “obvious,” the state of mind with regard to any assessment of  
the materiality of a statement was, or could be, a factor in the necessary scienter analysis.88  In 
                                                                                                                                                             
action, although a reasonable man would not so regard it.” Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 22 
n.5 (1999) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538 (1977)). 
84 See supra text accompanying notes 24-31.  
85 In re Dell Inc. Sec. Litig., 591 F. Supp. 2d 877,  894-95 (W.D. Tex. 2008). 
86 See supra text accompanying notes 11-17. 
87 PR Diamonds, 364 F.3d at 685-86. 
88 Horwich, supra note 5, 55 BUS. LAW. at 1035-37.  The cases discussed there are 
summarized in this footnote. 
 In a leading Supreme Court case on insider trading, three Supreme Court justices would 
have held that the defendant’s own perception of the materiality of information is directly 
pertinent to the determination of scienter.  “[I]f the insider in good faith does not believe that the 
information is material or nonpublic, he also lacks the necessary scienter. In fact, the scienter 
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requirement functions in part to protect good faith errors of this type.” Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 
646, 674 n.11 (1983) (Blackmun, Brennan, & Marshall, JJ., dissenting) (citing Hochfelder, 425 
U.S. at 197, 211 n.31).  The majority in Dirks arguably also looked to judgments about the 
materiality of disclosed information in assessing whether disclosure violated Rule 10b-5. 
In some situations, the insider will act consistently with his fiduciary duty to 
shareholders, and yet release of the information may affect the market. For 
example, it may not be clear – either to the corporate insider or to the recipient 
analyst – whether the information will be viewed as material nonpublic 
information.  Corporate officials may mistakenly think the information already 
has been disclosed or that it is not material enough to affect the market.  Whether 
disclosure is a breach of duty therefore depends in large part on the purpose of the 
disclosure. 
Id. at 662. 
 
In SEC v. MacDonald, 699 F.2d 47, 50 (1st Cir. 1983) (en banc), an enforcement action 
alleging unlawful insider trading, the court stated that the element of scienter “is satisfied if at 
the time defendant purchased stock he had actual knowledge of undisclosed material 
information; knew it was undisclosed, and knew it was material . . . .” (emphasis added)  The 
court found that this third element was satisfied “when [the trial court] specifically found that 
defendant’s inside information was a motivating factor in his purchase” of stock. Id. at 51.  
In an earlier insider trading case, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a 
tipper’s scienter is established where the tipper “deliberately tips information which he knows to 
be material and non-public to an outsider who may reasonably be expected to use it to his 
advantage.”  Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 167 (2d Cir. 1980) (footnotes 
omitted). The court recognized that there was contrary authority on whether knowledge of the 
nonpublic nature of the information was an element of scienter, but did not note any similar 
difference of opinion with regard to knowledge of materiality. Id. at 167 & n.21.  The court also 
reserved the question whether recklessness as to the materiality of the information would suffice 
to sustain a finding of scienter, because there was actual knowledge of the materiality of the tip. 
Id. at 167-68 & n.22. 
In a case where the defendants had knowledge of undisclosed information but the 
materiality of those facts was uncertain, the court held that the defendants “did not know nor 
should have known the danger of misleading the customers by the omission.” Shivangi v. Dean 
Witter Reynolds, Inc., 825 F.2d 885, 889 (5th Cir. 1987).  In another case, after noting that a 
violation of Section 10(b) can be proven without a showing of a specific intent to violate the law, 
the court held that scienter is established where the defendants “know the materiality of the 
concealed information and intend the consequences of concealment.” Pittsburgh Terminal Corp., 
680 F.2d at 943.  There would be no scienter, however, if the defendants relied on counsel who 
“mistakenly but in good faith represent that some information is either immaterial or clear” 
because “[i]n such instances the defendants may not have an appreciation of the consequences of 
their conduct.” Id. at 943.  (For a further discussion of the relevance of reliance on counsel in this 
context, see infra text accompanying notes 112-126.)  At least one court has read Pittsburgh 
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the nearly dozen years since that article, a number of other cases have addressed the relevance of 
the defendant’s consciousness of, or inattention to (when not willfully ignorant), the materiality 
of the challenged statement in the context of the determination of scienter.89 
In its first decision interpreting the heightened scienter pleading standard under the 
PSLRA,90 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals took materiality into account in assessing the 
sufficiency of allegations of scienter.91  The court held that 
to establish scienter in a securities fraud case alleging non-disclosure of 
potentially material facts, the plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) the defendant knew 
of the potentially material fact, and (2) the defendant knew that failure to reveal 
the potentially material fact would likely mislead investors. The requirement of 
knowledge in this context may be satisfied under a recklessness standard by the 
                                                                                                                                                             
Terminal as requiring that “in the context of an omissions case, plaintiffs must show that 
defendants knew or were reckless in disregarding the materiality of the consequences of the 
concealed fact.” Eacho v. N D Resources, Inc., Civ. A. No. 83-2903, 1985 WL 1717, at *3 
(D.D.C. May 23, 1985).  In so ruling, the court recognized that the plaintiff need not prove that 
the defendant thought his actions were illegal. Id. 
These earlier cases suggest that the defendant’s own lack of awareness (or appreciation) 
of materiality – though it might have been “obvious” to others, such as the “reasonable man” – 
undermines a claim of acting with scienter. 
89 To be sure, there are many cases analyzing the scienter requirement that focus on the 
defendant’s awareness of, or recklessness in not appreciating, the falsity of the statement he 
made, with no specific reference to whether or not the defendant appreciated the materiality of 
the falseness.  See, e.g., Gebhart, 595 F.3d at 1042 (“although we may consider the objective 
unreasonableness of the defendant’s conduct to raise an inference of scienter, the ultimate 
question is whether the defendant knew his or her statements were false, or was consciously 
reckless as to their truth or falsity”).  These decisions are not necessarily inconsistent with those 
cases, discussed next in the text, that do reflect consideration of the defendant’s perception vel 
non of the materiality of a statement that was false or incomplete.  In many cases, for example, 
the materiality of the statements is beyond question. See supra text accompanying notes 24-31 
(discussing core operations cases).  At the same time, no case has been found expressly rejecting 
consideration of the defendant’s perception or analysis of the materiality of the facts known to 
him when determining whether the defendant (is alleged to have) acted with scienter. 
90 See supra  note 9. 
91 City of Philadelphia v. Fleming Companies, Inc., 264 F.3d 1245, 1248 (10th Cir. 
2001).  
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defendant’s knowledge of a fact that was so obviously material that the defendant 
must have been aware both of its materiality and that its non-disclosure would 
likely mislead investors.92 
With respect to the particular claims regarding non-disclosure of litigation, the court held: 
In regard to [the chief financial officer and principal accounting officer], Plaintiffs 
have provided no particular facts from which this court could plausibly infer their 
knowledge of the [undisclosed litigation], the underlying business practices at 
issue in that case, or the potential materiality of the lawsuit. . . . . [T]he mere fact 
that the individual Defendants occupied senior positions in the company, and that 
two of them knew of the litigation at least by early 1995, is not sufficient to imply 
knowledge of the specific fact of materiality.93 
Dismissal of the complaint was affirmed for this and other reasons.94  Here the court thus 
focused on whether the defendants appreciated (or were presumed to have appreciated) the 
materiality of the undisclosed facts.   
A lower court decision, citing both Sundstrand and Fleming Companies, observed, in 
upholding dismissal of a complaint for failure to allege scienter, “[K]nowledge or reckless 
disregard of the potential materiality of the information misstated or omitted is an element of 
scienter [that is] based on allegations of intentional or reckless misconduct.”95   
                                                 
92 Id. at 1261.   
93 Id. at 1263-64 (emphasis added). 
94 Id. at 1270. 
95 Wilson v. Bernstock, 195 F. Supp. 2d 619, 639 (D.N.J. 2002) (quoting the statement in 
Fleming Companies, 264 F.3d at 1260, that “allegations that the defendant possessed knowledge 
of facts that are later determined by a court to have been material, without more, is not sufficient 
to [permit an inference] that the defendant intentionally withheld those facts from, or recklessly 
disregarded the importance of those facts”).  While the facts alleged in that case to have been 
omitted ultimately proved to be material, there were no allegations “constituting strong 
circumstantial evidence that [prior to disclosure] Defendants either knew or recklessly 
disregarded: . . . (2) that such information would reveal materially more [expenses than had been 
estimated and publicly reported by [the company] in its financial statements.” Wilson, 195 F. 
Supp. 2d at 639-40.  Moreover, even if company executives were alleged to have been aware of 
problems, plaintiffs failed to allege “specific facts showing that Defendants either knew or 
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One district court analyzed the scienter allegations with respect to non-defendant 
corporate officers in order to determine whether scienter had been alleged against the 
corporation, the sole defendant.  In dismissing the complaint for failure to plead scienter, the 
court observed: 
[E]ven assuming that plaintiffs have adequately pleaded that such a person had 
actual knowledge of a particular fact and did not disclose it, this of itself is 
insufficient to raise a strong inference of scienter. Persons who sign, approve, or 
furnish information for SEC filings are often privy to myriad information that 
need not be released to the investing public. In fact, if marginally relevant 
information were disclosed in large volumes, it might prove counter productive 
[sic] by drowning out the disclosures that should catch the attention of investors 
and the investment community. Such persons do not therefore necessarily act with 
severe recklessness by failing to disclose all information of which they are aware. 
[Citation omitted] Under the severe recklessness standard for inferring intent to 
defraud, the omission of information is not actionable unless the individual also 
has actual knowledge of a danger of misleading investors, or the danger is so 
obvious that the individual must have been aware of it. [Citation omitted] 
 . . . . 
The complaint does not explain how any such individual acted with severe 
recklessness. Plaintiffs’ allegations rest solely on an individual’s knowledge of 
the facts that are set out in [the complaint]. The complaint does not explain why it 
would have been an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care for any 
individual who signed, ordered, furnished information for, or otherwise had some 
responsibility for the SEC filings to conclude that the . . . allegations needed to be 
disclosed to prevent investors from being deceived.96 
The import of this language is that the individuals did not act with scienter unless they 
recognized or were reckless in not recognizing the materiality of the information known to them 
and not disclosed. 
                                                                                                                                                             
should have known that any [amounts in question], once captured, would reveal a material 
difference” in expenditures compared to what had been estimated. Id. at 642. 
96 Milano v. Perot Systems Corp., Nos. 3:02-CV-1269-D, et al., 2006 WL 929325, at *14 
(N.D. Tex.  Mar. 31, 2006). 
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The cases discussed to this point predate the Supreme Court’s decision in Tellabs in 
2007, which construed the heightened pleading standard for scienter.97  That decision did not 
change the consideration of materiality when assessing scienter.  In Matrixx, the Court’s most 
recent case addressing materiality and scienter, after finding that the complaint adequately 
pleaded the materiality of the alleged misrepresentations the Court turned to the sufficiency of 
the scienter allegations.  Accepting arguendo that recklessness suffices to plead scienter,98 the 
Court did not find sufficiently plausible defendants’ proffered inference from the facts alleged 
that defendants did not disclose the adverse event reports regarding the drug they sold because 
they “believed they were too few . . . to indicate anything meaningful about adverse reactions” to 
the drug.99  The Court concluded that 
“taken collectively,” [the allegations] give rise to a “cogent and compelling” 
inference that Matrixx elected not to disclose the reports of adverse events not 
because it believed they were meaningless but because it understood their likely 
effect on the market.  “[A] reasonable person” would deem the inference that 
Matrixx acted with deliberate recklessness (or even intent) “at least as compelling 
as any opposing inference one could draw from the facts alleged.” 100 
In other words, the allegations supported a plausible inference, at least as compelling as an 
exculpatory one, that the defendants decided not to disclose the adverse event reports because 
they appreciated the materiality of the information.  While the use of the word “elected” sounds 
more like a deliberate decision than the recklessness the Court stated it was addressing,101 the 
                                                 
97 See supra note 9. 
98 Matrixx, 131 S. Ct. at 1323-24. 
99 Id. at 1324 (quoting from Brief for Petitioners). 
100 131 S. Ct. at 1324-25 (emphasis added) (quoting Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 323, 324). 
101 In assessing the inferences that could be drawn from the allegations in the complaint, 
the Court stated, “The inference that Matrixx acted recklessly (or intentionally, for that matter) is 
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core of the analysis focused on the defendants’ appreciation of the significance of the 
information: the defendants argued that it was plausible that they did not think the information 
was “meaningful,” a synonym in this context for “material,” and the Court found the contrary 
inference to be at least as strong.  Thus, the defendants’ perception of the significance of the 
information was at the heart of the Court’s scienter analysis.  The defendants could argue to the 
jury that, before Matrixx announced that it could not determine if the active ingredient in the 
product had adverse effects,102 defendants in fact made a good faith considered decision not to 
disclose the adverse event reports because they believed they were not material, or that 
disclosure of those reports could have portrayed an unduly negative picture as of the time the 
statements were made.  As the Court stated, “Whether respondents can ultimately prove their 
allegations and establish scienter is an altogether different question.”103 
Turning to the lower courts after Tellabs, in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals the 
scienter standard continues to include consideration of strong circumstantial evidence of 
conscious misbehavior or recklessness.104  Where facts allegedly omitted were marginally 
material at most, “the duty to disclose [the omitted fact] was not so clear” and accordingly 
“defendants’ recklessness cannot be inferred from the failure to disclose.”105 In a more recent 
                                                                                                                                                             
at least as compelling, if not more compelling, than the inference that it simply thought the 
reports did not indicate anything meaningful about the adverse reactions.” 131 S. Ct. at 1324. 
102 Id. at 1316. 
103 Id. at 1325. 
104 Kalnit v. Eichler, 264 F.3d 131, 142 (2d Cir. 2001) (pre-Tellabs); ECA and Local 134 
IBEW Joint Pension Trust of Chicago v. JP Morgan Chase Co., 553 F.3d 87, 202-203 (2d Cir. 
2009) (post-Tellabs). 
105 Kalnit, 264 F.3d at 143 (citing district court opinion in which the facts were held not 
to be material, an issue the court of appeals did not address directly, id. at 144). 
 -32-  
case, affirming the dismissal of a complaint, that court held that the plaintiffs had failed to plead 
the materiality of omitted facts; given this failure, “Plaintiffs certainly did not plead that 
defendants had knowledge of the transactions’ materiality,” nor did they plead recklessness in 
the sense of ignoring a danger that was either known to them or so obvious that the defendants 
must have been aware of it.106 
In the Ninth Circuit “[e]vidence showing that the defendants did not appreciate the 
gravity of the risk of misleading others is relevant” to a determination of whether they acted with 
deliberate recklessness or conscious recklessness as a species of scienter.107  Most of the opinion 
just quoted from, however, appears to focus on the defendants’ awareness of the falsity of their 
statements rather than on the perception of the materiality of the statements.   
In a decision by the First Circuit Court of Appeals,108 defendants were sued under Rule 
10b-5 for failing to disclose that a regulatory change in Japan, where the company did significant 
business, would adversely affect the company’s financial performance.  In affirming dismissal of 
the complaint by the district court, the court of appeals stated: 
The question of whether a plaintiff has pled facts supporting a strong 
inference of scienter has an obvious connection to the question of the extent to 
which the omitted information is material. . . . “[T]he question of whether 
Defendants recklessly failed to disclose [a fact] is . . . intimately bound up with 
whether Defendants either actually knew or recklessly ignored that the [fact] was 
material and nevertheless failed to disclose it.” City of Philadelphia v. Fleming 
Cos., 264 F.3d 1245, 1265 (10th Cir. 2001). If it is questionable whether a fact is 
material or its materiality is marginal, that tends to undercut the argument that 
                                                 
106 ECA, 553 F.3d  at 202-203. 
107 Platforms Wireless, 617 F.3d at 1093-94 (9th Cir. 2010) (affirming summary 
judgment for plaintiff). 
108 Waters Corp., 632 F.3d 751. 
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defendants acted with the requisite intent or extreme recklessness in not 
disclosing the fact.109  
Further, “the key question” is not whether defendants had knowledge of certain undisclosed 
facts, but rather whether defendants knew or should have known that their failure to disclose 
those facts presented a danger of misleading buyers or sellers.110  Taking into account the 
magnitude and probability that the change in Japanese government regulations would affect the 
company’s business, “viewed objectively, the inferences are stronger that defendants did not 
knowingly or recklessly risk misleading the reasonable investor, as defendants reasonably did 
not expect that the change in Japanese drinking water testing regulations would itself have a 
significant impact on Waters’ overall worldwide sales during 2007, such as to require 
disclosure.”111   
This line of cases extending over thirty years recognizes that the materiality of an omitted 
statement is relevant to whether the defendant’s failure to make disclosure was reckless in terms 
of actual or imputed awareness of a risk of misleading investors. 
 C. The Parallel with “Reliance on Counsel”  
In assessing whether the defendant’s perception – state of mind – regarding the element 
of materiality is relevant in determining whether the defendant acted with scienter it would be 
useful to consider what other indicia of the state of mind have been considered by courts in 
addressing scienter.  Both caselaw and commentary acknowledge that reliance on professional 
                                                 
109 Id. at 757 (emphasis added).  
110 Id. at 758. 
111 Id. at 758-59 (emphasis added). 
 -34-  
advice may be taken into account when assessing the defendant’s good faith, which relates to 
scienter.112   
Although “[a] good faith reliance on the advice of counsel is not a defense to securities 
fraud [it is] a means of demonstrating good faith and represents possible evidence of an absence 
of any intent to defraud.”113  (The staff of the SEC acknowledges that there is something known 
as the “advice-of-counsel defense, though it does not identify what the elements are.114)  Where 
                                                 
112 In addition to the cases discussed in this subsection of this Article, see the discussion 
of Pittsburgh Terminal, supra note 88. 
113 United States v. Peterson, 101 F.3d 375, 381 (5th Cir. 1996).  The court approved the 
following instruction that was given to the jury: 
Reliance on the advice of an attorney may constitute good faith. To decide 
whether such reliance was in good faith, you may consider whether the Defendant 
sought the advice of a competent attorney concerning the material fact allegedly 
omitted or misrepresented, whether the Defendant gave his attorney all the 
relevant facts known to him at the time, whether the Defendant received an 
opinion from his attorney, whether the Defendant believed the opinion was given 
in good faith and whether the defendant reasonably followed the opinion. 
Id. at 382 n.5 (emphasis added by court of appeals).  See also Howard v. SEC, 376 F.3d 1136, 
1147 (D.C. Cir.  2004) (“reliance on the advice of counsel need not be a formal defense; it is 
simply evidence of good faith, a relevant consideration in evaluating a defendant’s scienter”). 
There is a corresponding relevant factor of reliance on an accountant. See SEC v. Snyder, 
292 Fed. Appx. 391, 406 (5th Cir. 2008): 
 
We find no meaningful distinction between the reliance on counsel and 
reliance on an accountant. Both defensive theories provide an explanation of the 
defendant’s conduct tending to negate the element of scienter. Under both 
theories, the jury is free to decide for itself whether the facts demonstrate that the 
defendant acted with scienter in light of the advice he received from his attorneys 
or accountants. The defendant does not have the burden of proving any 
“elements” of the defense before the jury can weigh the defendant’s theory of 
reliance. However, a district court may suggest relevant factors that the jury may 
consider in its deliberations, such as the instruction approved in Peterson.   
114 SEC Division of Enforcement, ENFORCEMENT MANUAL 99 (Feb. 8, 2011), 
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/enforcementmanual.pdf: 
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reliance on counsel is recognized as rebuttal to proof of scienter, the defendant must show that he 
“1) made a complete disclosure to counsel; (2) requested counsel’s advice as to the legality of the 
contemplated action; (3) received advice that it was legal; and (4) relied in good faith on that 
advice.”115  Counsel’s advice can be a favorable factor for the defendant only if his reliance on it 
was justifiable.116   
As a matter of policy it is sensible to take good faith reliance on counsel into account 
because doing so encourages a person about to make disclosure or to enter into a securities 
transaction to consult experienced counsel.117  Asserting reliance on counsel, however, does not 
come without a cost. Invoking reliance on counsel’s advice entails a waiver of otherwise 
                                                                                                                                                             
 In order to rely on advice-of-counsel as a defense, a party must waive the 
attorney-client privilege and work product protection to the extent necessary to 
enable the staff to evaluate the defense. Staff at the Assistant Director level or 
higher should attempt to explore the possibility of an advice-of-counsel defense 
with a party’s counsel at an early stage in the investigation. It is important to 
obtain all relevant documents and testimony at the earliest possible date. 
115 SEC v. Savoy Industries, Inc., 665 F.2d 1310, 1314 n.28 (D.C.Cir. 1981). 
116 Papilsky v. Berndt, No. 71 Civ. 2534, 1976 WL 792, [1976-77 Transfer Binder] Fed. 
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 95,627, at 90,133 (S.D.N.Y. June 24, 1976) (ruling against defendants 
after trial on claim for breach of fiduciary duty, the court rejected defendants’ reliance on 
counsel as a defense where “there were numerous indications from authoritative sources that 
counsel’s advice should not have been treated as dispositive”). 
117 See United States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285, 1292 (2d Cir. 1991) (“The potential 
societal benefit [of consulting counsel] may be great in cases like the one at bar, where defendant 
seeks legal advice in order to act within the confines of highly complex federal securities laws.”). 
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privileged communications with counsel.118  This may result in a broader inquiry into the 
communications between attorney and client than the client-defendant anticipated.119 
Reliance on counsel is most clearly pertinent when the defendant obtained counsel’s 
assessment of a purely legal matter.120  One commentator observed: 
The Supreme Court’s definition of scienter requires deceptive, 
manipulative, or fraudulent intent. Deception in the form of an omission, 
however, is only a violation of the securities laws where there is some sort of 
legal duty to disclose and where the omission is material. Furthermore, as a 
general rule, a violation of the law that occurred as part of a relevant transaction is 
a material fact that must be disclosed.  Thus in some circumstances scienter might 
require knowledge that some aspect of a transaction was illegal, since otherwise 
the actor would not know the fact that her omission was material. 
. . . .  
. . . [T]aken as a whole, the case law reveals a pattern it fails to recognize: 
ignorance of the law is a defense when the sole omitted material fact relates to the 
contents of the law. Ignorance of the law is only a defense when it negates an 
element of the offense — in the case of securities fraud, deceptive intent or 
scienter. 
                                                 
118 See Bilzerian, 926 F.2d  at 1291-92 (stating that if defendant, convicted of securities 
fraud, had testified at trial to his good faith belief that his conduct was legal and if this had been 
based on consultation with client, his testimony would have waived the attorney-client privilege 
as to those communications). 
119  For a discussion of the possible subject matter waiver when a client waives the 
attorney-client privilege with respect to specific communications, see EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, 
THE NEW WIGMORE – A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE § 6.12.7 (2d ed. 2010) (discussing “fairness test, 
a broad version of the subject matter test, and a narrow version of the latter test” when the 
privilege has been waived as to a specific communication). 
120 See Steed Finance LDC. v. Nomura Securities Intern., Inc., 148 Fed. Appx. 66, 69 (2d 
Cir. 2005) (affirming grant of summary judgment for defendant where scienter was negated by 
showing reliance on counsel to determine that certain investments had the legal characteristics 
that defendant had represented); Howard, 376 F.3d at 1146-47 (holding that scienter was not 
established where respondent relied on counsel’s interpretation of SEC rule); SEC v. Steadman, 
967 F.2d 636, 642-43 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (holding that defendants did not act with scienter where 
they relied on counsel’s incorrect determination that mutual funds were not required to register 
sales of their shares under state law and thus did not disclose liabilities that could arise from a 
failure to register). 
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 . . . .  
 This limited mistake of law defense is also consistent with the Supreme 
Court’s formulations of scienter and the mistake of law defense. When some 
alleged deception is based on an omission that involves the contents of the law, 
ignorance of the law will negate deceptive intent – just as ignorance of the law 
regarding the ownership of property negates theft when it leads one to wrongly 
believe that some piece of property is his. . . .  Finally, this approach maintains the 
traditional distinction between ignorance of facts and ignorance of the law.121 
Under this approach reliance on counsel should also be taken into account when counsel 
was consulted for advice on whether a fact is material, and thus needs to be disclosed in order for 
what is otherwise stated not to be a misleading half truth, even where the omitted fact does not 
relate solely to the legality of a matter.  This is so because materiality is a mixed question of fact 
and law,122 so that counsel is often relied on when making disclosure judgments.  On this topic, 
one commentator has stated: 
Advice as to materiality, unlike facts, often involves legal as well as 
factual judgments. While the businessman ought to be able to judge what is 
material to investors, and do so more accurately than counsel, in the end judges, 
                                                 
121 Alexander P. Robbins, After Howard and Monetta: Is Ignorance of the Law a Defense 
to Administrative Liability for Aiding and Abetting Violations of the Federal Securities Laws?, 
74 U. CHI. L. REV. 299, 321, 326-27 (2007) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).  The cited 
article provides an extensive analysis of the lines of securities law cases that have addressed the 
extent to which “ignorance of the law” is a defense or a factor rebutting an element of the 
plaintiff’s (including the SEC’s) case.  With respect to Howard (supra note 115) in particular, 
that author concluded: 
Howard should have been held liable for aiding and abetting securities fraud if the 
SEC proved that he either (1) knew the offering violated Rule 10b-9, or (2) 
realized that a rational investor would find it material that his firm had to 
purchase shares itself in order to save the offering. The D.C. Circuit held that 
Howard was ignorant of the law (that is, Rule 10b-9), so the key remaining 
question would, under this approach, be whether Howard knew that his deception 
was material to investors.  
Id. at 326 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).  The emphasized language suggests that 
appreciation of the materiality of the omitted information could be a factor relevant to scienter. 
 
122 See supra text accompanying notes 35-37. 
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not laymen, give meaning to the notion of materiality, and counsel often serve the 
essential role of framing the business judgment – interpreting the materiality 
concept as applied to the facts in question, so that the business judgment is 
rendered in the proper context. 
 Thus, it is not surprising to find that reliance on counsel’s advice as to the 
immateriality of facts omitted from disclosure has served to support the due care 
or lack of scienter defense. It should be emphasized, however, that reliance on 
counsel’s view that a particular matter is immaterial will not help where that 
matter is falsely stated or described in a misleading way in the prospectus or 
proxy statement, and the defendant knew or recklessly disregarded this fact. It is 
only in cases of omission where the reliance defense will help when the advice of 
counsel relates to materiality.123 
In the seminal article on reliance on counsel in matters arising under the securities laws, 
written before Hochfelder clarified the standard of culpability under Rule 10b-5, the authors 
presented an “on the one hand, on the other hand” perspective. 
A similar but distinguishable situation occurs when the defendant knows 
the statement is misleading but, based on his attorney’s advice, believes that the 
inaccuracy is not material. Again, this may be regarded as either factual or legal 
advice – the attorney advises either that the false statement is not important 
enough to affect investment decisions or that the statement would not be 
considered material by a court.  In this case, however, the distinction may not 
matter. Since defendant knows the statement is misleading, he would appear to 
lack good faith. Only where knowledge of materiality is deemed an indispensable 
element of bad faith, as it is under certain circumstances, would defendant’s 
knowledge that the statement is misleading, to whatever extent, not result in his 
being held liable. . . . 
Certainly the lawyer’s expertise on this factual issue of materiality is 
arguable. The client might well be more justified in relying on a security analyst, 
or on his own experience, for what is essentially a nonlegal judgment. A court 
reasoning in this way may reject reliance on counsel as a defense under a due care 
standard on the basis that the defendant should have known by exercising his own 
judgment that the fact in question was material. Under a good faith standard, the 
reasonableness of defendant’s reliance, of course, would not be relevant. Thus if 
                                                 
123 Bevis Longstreth, Reliance on Advice of Counsel as a Defense to Securities Law 
Violations, 37 BUS. LAW. 1885, 1195 (1982) (footnotes omitted).  In the present author’s 
personal experience in private practice, clients often rely heavily on counsel’s judgment on the 
materiality of a fact, whether deciding what information needs to be disclosed in the context of 
other mandated disclosures or in deciding whether or not it is permissible to trade securities 
when the information in question known to the client is nonpublic. 
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materiality were part of the good faith requirement, reliance on counsel’s advice 
here might be a defense proving good faith, if not due care. Since knowledge of 
materiality would, however, seem to be evidence of bad faith, reliance in this 
situation is probably not a defense under either standard. Yet, because these issues 
of materiality arise frequently, a securities lawyer is more likely than a layman to 
have a “feel” for the adequacy of a press release, even as to factual matters or 
impact on investors.124 
Insofar as the need to rely on counsel for materiality judgments is concerned, the authors note – 
writing before the meaning of “materiality” was clarified in TSC and Basic – “For example, a 
layman would not even be aware of the various verbal formulations of materiality in terms of 
whether investors ‘should,’ ‘might,’ ‘may,’ or ‘would’ be affected and whether materiality is to 
be measured by the impact of the information on the speculative, conservative, average, or other 
investor.”125  More directly pertinent to the issues addressed in this Article, the authors stated, 
“One common situation where reliance on legal advice might be relevant is where a director, 
before trading, consults his company counsel and is advised that such trading is lawful because 
his nonpublic knowledge is, in the attorney’s opinion, either immaterial or adequately 
disseminated.”126  More recent scholarship has noted the importance of participation by counsel 
in determining questions of materiality.127 
                                                 
124 Douglas W. Hawes & Thomas J. Sherrard, Reliance on Advice of Counsel as a 
Defense in Corporate and Securities Cases, 62 VA. L. REV. 1, 130-31 (1976) (footnotes omitted).   
125 Id. at 131 n.552.  This difficulty remains after TSC and Basic. See supra text 
accompanying notes 53-51.  
126 Hawes & Sherrard, supra note 124, 62 VA. L. REV. at 133.  In fact, it is common for 
the insider trading policies of public companies to require that directors and senior management 
preclear any trades in company stock with the company’s general counsel or other designated 
person. See, e.g., Ari B. Lanin & Daniela L. Stolman, Building a Better Insider Trading 
Compliance Program, 25 INSIGHTS No. 3, 9, at 14 (Mar. 2011) (recommending including 
preclearance requirement for all directors, officers and certain other persons); 18A LANGEVOORT, 
supra note 71, App. F, at App. F-3 (option 3) (providing for prior approval of transactions by all 
directors, officers and employees in company securities, as well as in securities of “any other 
company that you know has or is in the process of establishing a significant business 
relationship” with the company);  WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 66, at § 13.6.2[B], at 896 
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The two preceding analyses may be flawed in one respect.  They both draw a distinction 
between what might be called a pure omission, that is, a failure to disclose altogether, and a 
statement that is misleading, where it is known to be misleading.  A misleading statement is 
actionable under Rule 10b-5 only if it is materially deceptive, so that a statement that is false, but 
in an immaterial way, should no more give rise to a claim of scienter than a complete failure to 
disclose something that is not material, where if the information were material, there would have 
been a duty to disclose it.  The concept of “immaterially misleading” may be an oxymoron, but if 
the thought sought to be conveyed by these commentators is that one acts with scienter, an intent 
to deceive, when one utters an immaterially false statement, that is incorrect.  If the point sought 
to be made is that uttering a statement known to be “misleading” is always wrongful because a 
statement is misleading only if it influences the hearer’s decision, then the analysis is consistent 
with the argument in this Article that the purpose of the disclosure is a fundamental inquiry. 
These analyses suggest that the defendant’s awareness vel non of the materiality of 
omitted facts, which may arise when he is ignorant of the legal consequences of some act 
whether or not that act itself has been disclosed, bears on whether the defendant acted with 
scienter.  It follows that if the defendant made full disclosure to counsel regarding the facts 
known to him and sought advice about their materiality, and if counsel advised him that the 
                                                                                                                                                             
(recommending that corporate insider trading policy “should require all officers and director to 
consult with the corporate secretary or a designated compliance person before purchasing or 
selling securities issued by the corporation”) (footnote omitted); TheCorporateCounsel.net, 
Survey Results: TRADING POLICIES FOR OUTSIDE DIRECTORS, 
http://www.thecorporatecounsel.net/survey/Mar06_total.htm (June 2005) (reporting that 88.75% 
of 80 public company survey respondents require preclearance of trades by outside directors) (on 
file with author). 
127 See COX, HILLMAN & LANGEVOORT, supra note 57, at 585-86 (“Because the 
materiality concept is such a workhorse in securities regulation, learning to apply it is probably 
the most valuable skill securities lawyer can acquire.”); see also supra notes 57-59 (discussing 
role of counsel in making determinations of materiality). 
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information was not material and that defendant could proceed with the proposed conduct 
without further disclosure, that should be pertinent to the analysis of scienter, even if it does not 
necessarily preclude a finding of scienter. 
IV. SEC ACTIONS THAT HAVE ADDRESSED THE INTERSECTION OF 
MATERIALITY AND SCIENTER 
The views of the SEC, as the agency that adopted and enforces Rule 10b-5, are often 
entitled to deference by the courts.128  It is therefore useful to consider what actions the SEC has 
taken when materiality may be pertinent to scienter. 
 A. SEC Rules and Regulations 
The SEC addressed the relationship of materiality and scienter when it adopted 
Regulation FD.129  In general terms, Regulation FD provides that “when an issuer, or person 
acting on its behalf, discloses material nonpublic information to certain enumerated persons (in 
general, securities market professionals and holders of the issuer’s securities who may well trade 
on the basis of the information), it must make public disclosure of that information.”130   If a 
                                                 
128 See SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 813-14 (2002) (stating that SEC’s “interpretation 
of the statute’s ambiguous text in the context of formal adjudication is entitled to deference”).  
But see Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S.Ct. 2869, 2887-88 (2010) (declining to 
defer to SEC interpretation, because the SEC relied on cases of which the Court disapproved). 
129 17 C.F.R. Part 243 (2011).   
130 Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, supra note 70, 65 F.R. at 51716.  By its 
terms, a failure to comply with Regulation FD shall not, without more, be sufficient to constitute 
a Rule 10b-5 violation. Regulation FD, Rule 102, 17 C.F.R. § 243.102 (2011).  Moreover: 
Regulation FD is an issuer disclosure rule that is designed to create duties only 
under Sections 13(a) and 15(d) of the Exchange Act and Section 30 of the 
Investment Company Act. It is not an antifraud rule, and it is not designed to 
create new duties under the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws or 
in private rights of action. 
Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 F.R. at 51726  (footnote omitted).  Thus, Regulation 
FD itself is not an interpretation of Rule 10b-5.  Elsewhere in the release that promulgated 
 -42-  
public company or someone acting on its behalf “intentional[ly]” discloses material nonpublic 
information to someone among specified categories of persons, the information must be publicly 
disclosed simultaneously, and if there is an “non-intentional” nonpublic material disclosure there 
must be prompt public disclosure.131   In adopting Regulation FD, the SEC stated: 
[W]e have made clear that where the regulation speaks of “knowing or reckless” 
conduct, liability will arise only when an issuer’s personnel knows or is reckless 
in not knowing that the information selectively disclosed is both material and 
nonpublic. This will provide additional assurance that issuers will not be second-
guessed on close materiality judgments.132 
The Commission also stated that “in view of the definition of recklessness that is prevalent in the 
federal courts, it is unlikely that issuers engaged in good-faith efforts to comply with the 
regulation will be considered to have acted recklessly.”133   Finally on this topic, the SEC stated: 
[W]e emphasize that the definition of “intentional” in Rule 101(a) requires that 
the individual making the disclosure must know (or be reckless in not knowing) 
that he or she would be communicating information that was both material and 
nonpublic. Thus, in the case of a selective disclosure attributable to a mistaken 
determination of materiality, liability will arise only if no reasonable person under 
the circumstances would have made the same determination. As a result, the 
circumstances in which a selective disclosure is made may be important. We 
recognize, for example, that a materiality judgment that might be reckless in the 
context of a prepared written statement would not necessarily be reckless in the 
context of an impromptu answer to an unanticipated question.134 
                                                                                                                                                             
Regulation FD, however, the SEC expressly offered an interpretation of the concept of 
recklessness under Rule 10b-5. See infra text accompanying note 133. 
131 Regulation FD, Rules 100-101, 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100 & 101 (2011).  Disclosure is 
“intentional” when “the person making the disclosure either knows, or is reckless in not 
knowing, that the information he or she is communicating is both material and nonpublic.” 
Regulation FD, Rule 101(a), 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(a) (2011). 
132 Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, supra note 70, 65 F.R. at 51718 (emphasis 
added).    
  
133 Id. at 51722 (footnote omitted in which Sundstrand was cited). 
134 Id. at 51722 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).  In one case brought for a violation 
of Regulation FD the SEC separately found, as the regulation requires, that the respondent knew 
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These statements reflect the Commission’s recognition that a “mistaken determination of 
materiality” bears on whether a person acted recklessly as recklessness is “prevalent[ly]” 
understood under the securities laws, referring explicitly to the use of that term in proceedings 
under Rule 10b-5. 
When it adopted Regulation FD the SEC also noted that the corporation’s spokesperson’s 
state of mind vis-à-vis materiality is relevant in the context of disclosures to securities analysts. 
[A]n issuer is not prohibited from disclosing a non-material piece of information 
to an analyst, even if, unbeknownst to the issuer, that piece helps the analyst 
complete a “mosaic” of information that, taken together, is material. Similarly, 
since materiality is an objective test keyed to the reasonable investor, Regulation 
FD will not be implicated where an issuer discloses immaterial information whose 
significance is discerned by the analyst.135 
In other words, whether the speaker is culpable depends on whether or not she was actually 
aware  (the opposite of “unbeknownst”136) that she was supplying a piece of the analyst’s puzzle 
that would transform an array of immaterial items into a material whole.137 
Rule 14e-3, which prohibits trading while aware of material nonpublic information 
regarding an impending tender offer, provides that it is unlawful for a person to trade in the 
                                                                                                                                                             
that the facts he was selectively disclosing were material. In the Matter of Christopher A. Black, 
Order Instituting Cease-and-Desist Proceedings Pursuant to Section 21C of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, Making Findings, and Imposing a Cease-And-Desist Order, Admin. Proc. 
File No. 3-13625, 2009 WL 3047553, at *4 , at  ¶ 21 (Sept. 24, 2009). 
135 Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, supra note 70, 65 F.R. at 51722 (emphasis 
added).   
136 “Unbeknownst” means “without the knowledge of (someone).” NEW OXFORD 
AMERICAN DICTIONARY 1878 (3d ed. 2010).  This was the meaning when Regulation FD was 
adopted. See WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT’L DICTIONARY 2483 (1976) (“happening without one’s 
knowledge”). 
137 A full discussion of the mosaic theory of materiality is beyond the scope of this 
article.  For brief discussions of that theory, see 18 LANGEVOORT, supra note 71, at § 11.5, at 11-
17 to -18; WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 66, at § 4.2.3[D]. 
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securities of the target company if the person “is in possession of material information relating to 
such tender offer which information he knows or has reason to know is nonpublic and which he 
knows or has reason to know has been acquired directly or indirectly from” certain specified 
categories of persons, including the offeror and the target.138  In contrast to Regulation FD, this 
prohibition was not conditioned upon a showing that the person knew or had reason to know the 
information was material.  Rule 14e-3, however, is a prophylactic rule that goes beyond 
fraudulent conduct.139 
 B. SEC Enforcement Complaints 
In some Rule 10b-5 insider trading cases filed by the SEC the Commission separately 
alleges the defendant’s knowledge that the facts known to him when he traded were material, as 
well as nonpublic.140  Thus, in a recent high-profile case involving an alleged law firm associate 
tipper, the Commission asserted: 
63. In each instance of insider trading, Kluger [the tipper] knew or was 
reckless in not knowing that the information that he misappropriated from Wilson 
Sonsini was material and nonpublic and that he was given access to that 
                                                 
138 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a) (2011). In adopting the rule, the SEC expressly 
acknowledged that there was no “know or has reason to know” test applicable to materiality, but 
did not explain why the rule included such a test for the nonpublic character of the information 
but not for its materiality. Tender Offers, Release No. 33-6329, 45 F.R. 60410 60413-14 (Sept. 
12, 1980). 
139 Rule 14e-3 was upheld by the Supreme Court, to the extent necessary to apply the rule 
to the case before it, stating, “A prophylactic measure, because its mission is to prevent, typically 
encompasses more than the core activity prohibited. . . .   [T]he Commission may prohibit acts 
not themselves fraudulent under the common law or § 10(b), if the prohibition is ‘reasonably 
designed to prevent . . . acts and practices [that] are fraudulent.’” United States v. O’Hagan, 521 
U.S. 642, at 672-73 (1997) (quoting Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77n(e) 
(2006)). 
140 The author has not done a systemic review, or even random sampling, of insider 
trading complaints filed by the SEC, either for a recent period or over time.  The import of the 
material that follows is merely to note that from time to time the SEC pleads insider trading 
claims under Rule 10b-5 in a manner that is consistent with the thesis of this Article. 
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information with the expectation that he owed, and would abide by, a fiduciary 
duty or similar duty of trust and confidence. 
. . . .  
78. Kluger, as a lawyer at Wilson Sonsini, knew or should have known 
that the information held by Wilson Sonsini regarding the Omniture tender offer 
had been acquired, directly or indirectly, from the offering entities, the target 
entities, and/or their advisers or representatives, and that such information was 
material and nonpublic.141 
In another case the Commission alleged that the defendant “knew, or was reckless in not 
knowing, that the information he misappropriated from his sister regarding the Bare tender offer 
was material and nonpublic.”142  In an insider trading action solely under Rule 10b-5, the SEC 
alleged that each of the defendants “knew, or was reckless in not knowing, that information 
                                                 
141 Complaint, SEC v. Kluger et al., No. 11-cv-01936-KSH (D.N.J. Apr. 6, 2011) 
(emphasis added), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2011/comp21917.pdf. The action 
was brought under both Rules 10b-5 and 14e-3. Although, as noted above (supra text 
accompanying notes 132-135), knowledge of the materiality of nonpublic facts is not an element 
of a Rule 14e-3 violation, Paragraph 78 quoted in the text was in the Rule 14e-3 count of the 
complaint.  There are no comparable allegations of knowledge of materiality in the criminal 
complaint filed against the same defendants. United States v. Bauer et al., Mag. No.: 11-3536 
(MF) (D.N.J. Apr. 6, 2011), 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/nj/Press/files/pdffiles/2011/Bauer,GarrettandKluger,MatthewCompl
aint.pdf.   
142 Complaint, SEC v. Ni, No 11 CV 0708 DMR, at ¶ 15 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2011) 
(emphasis added), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2011/comp21859.pdf.  The action 
was brought under both Rules 10b-5 and 14e-3; the quoted allegation was among the allegations 
relied upon in support of both claims.   The defendant settled the case. SEC Files Insider Trading 
Charges Against Brother of Cosmetics Company Executive, Lit. Rel. No. 21859 (Feb 16, 2011), 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2011/lr21859.htm. 
Among other insider trading complaints that contain a specific allegation of the 
defendant’s knowledge, or recklessness in not knowing, of the materiality of nonpublic 
information, see SEC v. Duffell, No. CV 11-1404 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2011), at ¶ 18, 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2011/comp21899.pdf.  That case was settled. SEC 
Charges Former Consultant at Silicon Valley Private Investment Firm with Insider Trading, Lit. 
Rel. No. 21899 (Mar. 24, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2011/lr21899.htm);  
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regarding the pending acquisition of [the company whose securities they traded] was 
confidential, material and nonpublic.”143   
It may be unwarranted to argue that these pleadings reflect the view of some members of 
the Commission or its staff that proof of knowledge of materiality is a distinct element of the 
violation, but these are public utterances, on repeated occasions, including at least one especially 
noteworthy case (Kluger), that reflect a perspective on what the elements of the violation are.  
One would not expect the SEC to plead more than it believes it must prove. 
More commonly, however, there is no allegation in the SEC’s insider trading complaints 
that the defendant was aware of the materiality of the undisclosed information.  For example, the 
allegations in one recent case regarding a primary violation of Rule 10b-5 stated only that the 
defendants “learned during the course of their employment the material nonpublic information 
each conveyed, and each knew, recklessly disregarded, or should have known, that each, 
directly, indirectly or derivatively, owed a fiduciary duty, or obligation arising from a similar 
relationship of trust and confidence, to keep the information confidential,” and that they “tipped 
material nonpublic information to their respective tippee(s) with the expectation of receiving a 
benefit.”144  When alleging aiding and abetting a violation of Rule 10b-5 in the same complaint, 
however, the SEC asserted that the defendants “knowingly or recklessly pass[ed] along 
                                                 
143 Complaint, SEC v. Steffes, No. 1:10-cv-06266, at ¶¶ 65-69 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2010),  
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2010/comp21678.pdf.  One defendant has settled the 
case. Securities and Exchange Commission v. Rex C. Steffes, Cliff M. Steffes, Rex R. Steffes, 
Bret W. Steffes, Robert J. Steffes and W. Gary Griffiths, Case No. 1:10-cv-06266 (N.D. Ill., filed 
September 30, 2010), Lit. Rel. No. 21678 (Sept. 30, 2010), 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2010/lr21678.htm. 
144 Amended Complaint, SEC v. Longoria, 11-CV-0753 (JSR), at ¶¶ 131-32 (S.D.N.Y. 
Feb. 8, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2011/comp21844.pdf.  This approach is 
consistent with the SEC’s definition of what it means to trade “on the basis of” material 
nonpublic information, namely that the “person was aware of the material nonpublic information 
when the person made the purchase or sale.” Rule 10b5-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (2011). 
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information which they knew to be material nonpublic information,”145 language that again 
suggests a distinct requirement of knowing that the information is material. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In an action under Rule 10b-5 where the claim rests on the defendant’s recklessness, 
rather than a conscious intent to deceive, the pivotal question is whether the defendant acted with 
an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care that presented a danger of misleading 
buyers or sellers that was either known to the defendant or was so obvious that he must have 
been aware of it.146  This necessitates an inquiry into what the defendant perceived, or should 
have perceived, the risk of misleading to be,147 albeit in cases where the materiality of the 
omitted information is patent the risk will be deemed known to him, or at least he cannot rebut 
that it was “so obvious he must have been aware of it.”148  It is important to stress that it is not 
whether the facts are known (or obvious) to him, but rather whether the risk of the effect of non-
disclosure is known, which directly implicates the materiality of the information.  That is, there 
is no risk of (unlawful) deception if the information is not material.149   
The cases discussed in Part III of this Article establish that the defendant’s good faith 
lack of appreciation of the materiality of the omission of facts, whether the context is a corporate 
disclosure or personal securities trading, bears directly on his scienter.  This is consistent with 
the scienter analysis where the defendant claims good faith reliance on counsel, not only where 
                                                 
145 Amended Complaint, SEC v. Longoria, supra note 144, at ¶¶ 141-42. 
146 See supra text accompanying notes 11-17, 28 and 73-76. 
147 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 101 and 107 
148 See supra text accompanying notes 24-28. 
149 See supra text accompanying notes 17 and 73-76. 
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counsel provides advice on a pure question of law but also where the issue addressed by counsel 
is a mixed question of fact and law, such as materiality.150 
Consider this example.  The chief executive officer of a public company is about to begin 
the quarterly earnings conference call.  The company is in contract negotiations with its major 
customer and failure to retain the customer would have a significant adverse financial impact on 
the company.  After assessing the current status of negotiations – negotiations are routine, no 
potentially troublesome issues have emerged nor have any threats of non-renewal even been 
hinted at – and perhaps after conferring with counsel, the CEO concludes, applying the 
probability-magnitude calculus for future events, that the present state of negotiations is not 
material.151  When asked during the call if there any developments regarding the company’s 
array of major customers the executive answers that there are none.  Within weeks negotiations 
break down, the customer takes it business elsewhere, this fact is announced, the company’s 
stock drops and a Rule 10b-5 suit follows, contending that the company and the CEO made a 
material misrepresentation with scienter when he denied that there were any developments 
regarding its customers.  The plaintiff should not be able to establish liability under Rule 10b-5 
because the executive made a good faith, i.e., non-reckless, judgment that the situation he did not 
disclose was not material – he did not intend to engage in any deception, much less “material” 
deception, nor was he reckless in failing to perceive the risk that materialized.   
Alter these facts a bit.  At the time of the earnings conference call the negotiations with 
the customer are not going as well as hoped, but there has not yet been an impasse, much less a 
complete parting of company.  Again, the CEO, possibly with the benefit of advice of counsel, 
                                                 
150 See supra text accompanying notes 112-127 (addressing reliance on counsel) and 35-
37  (discussing the mixed nature of the issue of materiality). 
151 For this materiality test, see supra text accompanying note 38. 
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makes the judgment that the status of negotiations is not material, again applying the 
probability/magnitude assessment.  Here, too, there has been no intent to deceive – the facts 
were, in the utmost good faith, thought to be immaterial – and it is not fair to say that the risk of 
misleading was “obvious.”  At some point in the continuum of negotiations before the actual 
break down in discussions the deterioration of the relationship undoubtedly becomes material.  
The question is whether errors in that assessment before materiality is beyond doubt – even when 
in hindsight the facts were material when the CEO concluded in good faith that they were not – 
support a finding of recklessness.152  I argue that they do not. 
It may be rare that an incomplete disclosure or trading based on a good faith (i.e., 
conscious) conclusion that a fact was not material is followed by a claim by a private plaintiff or 
the SEC that Rule 10b-5 was violated.  There is another group of cases, also likely small in 
relative number, where the defendant may not even have given thought to the materiality of what 
he knew that was nonpublic; here, too, if the risk of deception is not “obvious” because the facts 
were borderline material at most, then the defendant ought to be able to argue successfully his 
lack of scienter for failure to appreciate the materiality of what he knew.  Even though this issue 
may emerge in a small minority of cases, it must nevertheless be recognized as a factor in the 
scienter analysis to exonerate those to whom the concept applies. 
CH2\9599659.1\09.08.11  
 
                                                 
152 As commented earlier (supra text accompanying note 79), it seems bizarre to say that 
someone “intended to deceive” when he did not believe that what he failed to say would have 
been important to investors, that he believed disclosure would not have “significantly altered the 
‘total mix’ of information.” See supra text accompanying note 33. 
